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INFORMED TRADING, LIMIT ORDER BOOK AND
IMPLEMENTATION SHORTFALL: EQUILIBRIUM AND
ASYMPTOTICS
UMUT C¸ETI˙N AND HENRI WAELBROECK
Abstract. We propose a static equilibrium model for limit order book where N ≥
1 profit-maximizing investors receive an information signal regarding the liquidation
value of the asset and execute via a competitive dealer with random initial inventory.
While the dealer’s initial position plays a role similar to noise traders in Kyle [16], he
trades against a competitive limit order book populated by liquidity suppliers as in
Glosten [12]. We show that an equilibrium exists for bounded signal distributions,
obtain closed form solutions for Bernoulli-type signals and propose a straightforward
iterative algorithm to compute the equilibrium order book for the general case. We
obtain the exact analytic asymptotics for the market impact of large trades and
show that the functional form depends on the tail distribution of the private signal
of the insiders. In particular, the impact follows a power law if the signal has fat tails
while the law is logarithmic in case of lighter tails. Moreover, the tail distribution
of the trade volume in equilibrium obeys a power law in our model. We find that
the liquidity suppliers charge a minimum bid-ask spread that is independent of the
amount of ‘noise’ trading but increasing in the degree of informational advantage
of insiders in equilibrium. The model also predicts that the order book flattens
as the amount of noise trading increases converging to a model with proportional
transactions costs. In case of a monopolistic insider we show that the last slice
traded against the limit order book is priced at the liquidation value of the asset.
However, competition among the insiders leads to aggressive trading causing the
aggregate profit to vanish in the limiting case N → ∞. The numerical results
also show that the spread increases with the number of insiders keeping the other
parameters fixed. Finally, an equilibrium may not exist if the liquidation value is
unbounded. We conjecture that existence of equilibrium requires a sufficient amount
of competition among insiders if the signal distribution exhibit fat tails.
1. Introduction
Kyle [16] studies in a simple but remarkably powerful framework a single risk
neutral informed trader and a number of non-strategic uninformed liquidity traders
submitting orders to a market maker, who aggregates all the orders and clear the
market at a single price. Consequently, Kyle’s batch trading model does not produce
a bid-ask spread. However, his model allows for an explicit characterisation of equi-
librium parameters - including the optimal strategy of the informed trader as well as
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the equilibrium pricing rule. This in turn allows us to analyse how the private infor-
mation is disseminated to the market and gets incorporated into the prices over time.
In particular, Kyle’s lambda yields an explicit measurement of market’s liquidity and
price impact of trades.
While the role of the market makers and the price setting mechanism of Kyle’s
batch trading model were in line with the practices of specialists and floor traders
of the main exchanges in the the 80s, the role of the designated market makers has
diminished in recent years. Nowadays most of the equity and derivative exchanges
have moved to the electronic limit order book format. What distinguishes limit order
markets from markets with a uniform market-clearing price as in Kyle [16] is that
each limit order is executed at its respective limit price leading to discriminatory
pricing.
The case of liquidity suppliers moving first and submitting limit orders to be later
hit by potentially informed market order was first studied by Rock [23] and Glosten
[12]. In equilibrium even infinitesimal trades have significant impact, which results
in a positive bid-ask spread unlike the uniform price auction models. Following the
approach initiated by Rock and Glosten, Seppi [24] studies the liquidity provision
by a specialist competing against a competitive limit order book. His model also
allows a discussion on market design issues such as the effect of ‘tick size.’ Based on
the model assumptions of [24] Parlour and Seppi [18] build a model of competition
between exchanges. In another static model Foucault and Menkveld [10] consider an
equilibrium among limit order traders and a broker than can be one of two types and
use this model to study the effects of market fragmentation in the context of rivalry
between Euronext and the London Stock Exchange in the Dutch stock market.
While useful for policy purposes, the above static models have also some undesir-
able features. Probably the most unrealistic feature of these models is that, quoting
Parlour and Seppi [19], “investors either have an inelastic motive to trade, and are
willing to pay for immediate execution via market orders, or they are entirely disin-
terested liquidity providers with no reason to trade other than to be compensated for
supplying liquidity via limit orders.” In particular, unlike the Kyle’s model, their fo-
cus is more concentrated on the supply side of the liquidity and the investors’ trading
strategies are not completely endogenous. As a result, the shape of the limit order
book, which in general can only be obtained numerically, that arises in these models
does not truly capture the impact of trades by a rational investor with price elastic
motives.
In this paper we present a static microstructure model for the limit order book,
where the adverse selection occurs due to the existence of informed traders (henceforth
called insiders). Following Kyle [16], the insiders know the liquidation value V of
the asset in advance and place a market order to maximise their expected profit.
They submit their order to a competitive dealer who already has a position that
is independent from the liquidation value. The dealer trades the aggregate amount
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against a competitive limit order book populated by liquidity suppliers that arrived
to the market before the dealer and the insiders.
Our assumption that the limit order book is competitive requires a justification
in view of the results of Biais et al. [5] and Back and Baruch [3]. First of all, the
competitive offer curve should be viewed as a limiting book when the number of
limit order traders increases to infinity. However, as shown in an example in [3] the
competitive book is not always obtained as a limit of Nash equilibiria among finitely
many liquidity providers if the level of adverse selection faced by the limit order
traders is not high enough. In our model there is always sufficient adverse selection
since we assume that the dealer’s own demand for the asset is normally distributed.
Even though we model the interactions in a single period model, our framework also
has the flavour of a continuous-time Kyle model considered by Back [2]. Indeed, in
case of a monopolistic insider, we show that conditional on V = v the last infinitesimal
slice of the aggregate order traded by the dealer against the order book is priced at
v on average, reminiscing the convergence of the equilibrium price to the liquidation
value by the end of the trading horizon in the continuous-time Kyle model. Thus,
all private information gets incorporated into the order book once the last slice has
traded. This is in contrast with the corresponding Kyle model in one period1, which
is not surprising given the uniform pricing in the Kyle model.
The above ‘convergence’ result motivates the analysis of the case of multiple in-
siders. In the same vein as Holden and Subrahmanyam [14] we also model and solve
the imperfect competition among N ≥ 2 insiders who observe the liquidation value
V perfectly. As in [14] this competition leads to more aggressive trading. We find
that (conditional on V = v) the average price for the last slice traded by the dealer
exceeds v if the insiders are buying in equilibrium, which can be attributed to more
aggressive buying due to the competition. An analogous observation holds when the
optimal strategy in equilibrium is to sell. We obtain an explicit formula for the ag-
gregate profit of the insiders that shows that the aggregate profit converges to 0 as
N →∞.
We characterise the equilibrium strategy of insiders and the corresponding equilib-
rium order book as a solution of an integral equation, which is equivalently given by
the fixed point of an integral operator. Although this equation admits an analytic
solution only in very restrictive settings, its numerical implementation is straight-
forward. We establish the existence of equilibrium when the fundamental value is
bounded and obtain numerical solutions for a number of unbounded distributions
commonly found in the literature and used in practice.
Despite the fact that the exact form of the order book can only be solved numeri-
cally, we are nevertheless able to obtain the exact analytic asymptotics when the order
size is large. Moreover, due to the scaling property of the normal distribution, these
asymptotics still provide a good approximation for small orders if the variance of the
1In the corresponding one-period Kyle model, where V is normally distributed with mean 0, the
average price for the aggregate order conditional on V = v equals v2 .
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dealer’s demand is sufficiently small. The error in such an approximation appears to
be still low even in the case of higher variance as confirmed visually by our numerical
studies.
Due to the discriminatory pricing in the order book, our model produces a non-zero
bid-ask spread in equilibrium. We find that the bid-ask spread imposed by the limit
order traders is the same regardless of the variance of the initial inventory of the dealer.
The shape of the order book, however, is not invariant to the changes in this variance;
on the contrary, the order book flattens as it increases. That is, the limit order traders
do not need to extract significantly higher rents for larger trades if the information
content of the order is very small. In the limit the equilibrium converges to one where
the transaction cost is proportional to the trade size. Moreover, similar to the model
considered by Foucault [9], our model also predicts that a larger price volatility leads
to a bigger bid-ask spread - a phenomenon that is empirically documented by Ranaldo
[22]. Indeed, we show that the spread gets wider as the variance of the private signal
of the insiders increases, which corresponds to the case of a higher informational
advantage.
That we can compute the price impact of large trades has profound implications
for practitioners. Portfolio managers endeavour to find mispriced assets in order to
beat their benchmarks. When they decide to change their holdings to take advantage
of a mispricing, they create orders in an order management system; the trading desk
routes these orders to broker-dealers for execution. When they do so, on average, the
price to buy is greater than at the time of the decision, and vice-versa, the selling
price is lower, because the trade’s effect on supply and demand causes market impact.
The implementation shortfall is thereby the value lost by not being able to execute at
the decision price [20]. Understanding how this implementation shortfall scales with
trade size is essential to optimize the investment management process. A market
impact model is needed in order to maximize net trading profits. It is also important
to optimize position sizes, limit liquidity risk and estimate a portfolio’s capacity.
Empirical data provides some clues as to the shape and scale of market impact. In
particular, it has been known for some time that impact is a concave function of trade
size (see Torre [26]). But biases in the data, a low signal-to-noise ratio and other issues
prevent practitioners from determining the functional form of market impact precisely,
particularly for large trades where data is sparse. Models used by practitioners include
square root and logarithm (e.g. Torre [26], Potters and Bouchaud [21], Almgren et
al. [1], Bershova and Rakhlin [4], and Zarinelli et al. [29]). When calibrated to data,
these models yield similar results for small to moderate trade sizes, but they yield very
different predictions for the impact of for very large trades. This is unfortunate given
that the largest trades typically dominate the aggregate implementation shortfall for
most portfolios. The absence of a consensus on the shape of market impact for very
large trades motivates the search for a theoretical framework that would capture the
essential features of trading and yet be sufficiently parsimonious to be testable.
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We show that the market impact follows a power law or a logarithmic law depending
on the distribution of the liquidation value. The price impact, and equivalently the
implementation shortfall, has a power law if the liquidation value has fat tails while
lighter tails lead to a logarithmic behaviour.
Our framework also allows us to compute the tails of the probability distribution
associated with aggregate volume. For a large class of distributions that can be used
to model the liquidation value we show that the tail probability distribution for the
trade volume obeys a power law. The power-law behavior of order sizes has been
documented previously in various contexts: Gopikrishnan et al. [13] showed that the
market volume in a time interval ∆t has a power-law tail with exponent 1.7; Lillo et al.
consider off-book trades [17] and find an exponent ranging from 1.59 to 1.74. Vaglica
et al. reconstructed metaorders in Spanish stock exchange using data with brokerage
codes and found that the metaorder transaction size is distributed has a power law
tail with exponent 1.7 [28]. And in a study performed directly on institutional trade
data from Alliance Bernstein, Bershova and Rakhlin found a tail exponent 1.56 for
metaorder sizes [4].
Our proof of the existence of equilibrium assumes that the liquidation value of
the asset is bounded. However, our numerical experiments suggests that equilibrium
exists for a large class of unbounded signals. Moreover, the asymptotics of these
solutions agree with the analytical forms that our theory predicts. However, unlike
the bounded case, an equilibrium may not exist for all unbounded distributions.
Given the premise of numerical results and our formal calculations we conjecture that
existence of equilibrium requires a sufficient amount of competition among insiders if
the signal distribution exhibit fat tails. For instance, when the private signal is given
by a Student’s t-distribution our numerical iterations diverge in case of a monopolistic
insider.
We also consider an alternative model where instead of sending the order to a dealer
with an existing inventory, the informed investors send the order to an institutional
trading desk that also receives orders from noise traders. The aggregate is liquidated
against a limit order book; however, in the case of the institutional trading desk the
insiders and noise traders all receive allocations at the same average price. While we
were not able to find an existence proof for this model, numerical solutions are similar
to those of the dealer inventory model.
Structure of the paper is as follows: We present the dealer inventory model in the
next section. In Section 3, we show the existence of an equilibrium and characterize
some of its properties. Section 4 considers the asymptotic behaviour of market impact.
Numerical solutions are provided in Section 5 for the dealer inventory model. Section
6 explores the trading desk model numerically and compares results with the dealer
inventory model.
6 UMUT C¸ETI˙N AND HENRI WAELBROECK
2. The market structure and equilibrium
Our model is built upon Glosten [12] and the trading takes place in one-period:
There are three class of investors that are all risk-neutral: 1) competitive liquidity
suppliers who post limit orders, 2) a competitive dealer who clears the market, and
3) N ≥ 1 insider(s), who know(s) the liquidation value V of the asset. All random
variables in this section are assumed to be define on a complete probability space
(Ω,F , P ) and E is the expectation operator associated to P .
Liquidity suppliers move first and place limit orders that give rise to an order book.
That is, if the limit order book is defined by some function h : R → R, the market
order moving up (or down) the book faces a cost of h(y)dy as soon as hitting the
limit order at level y. The dealer already has Z ∼ N(0, σ2) number of shares of the
asset, which is assumed to be independent of V . The dealer’s initial inventory in the
asset is unknown by other market participants. The insider chooses a trade size X to
maximise her expected profit conditional on her private information.
Let us first consider the case N = 1. We assume that the cost of a market order of
X units by the insider is ∫ X
0
h(Z + y)dy. (2.1)
The above cost can be justified as a result of Bertrand competition among dealers
whose initial mean-zero inventories are normally distributed with identical variance
σ2. Indeed, first observe that when the insider trades X units via the dealer, the
dealer’s inventory changes from Z to Z + X . If the cost to the insider is given by
(2.1), the total profit of the dealer after trading via the liquidity suppliers is given by∫ X
0
h(Z + y)dy −
∫ X+Z
0
h(y)dy =
∫ X+Z
Z
h(y)dy −
∫ X+Z
0
h(y)dy = −
∫ Z
0
h(y)dy,
which is the cost of liquidating his initial inventory directly via the limit order book.
Therefore, no dealer will be willing to charge less than (2.1). The insider knows the
distribution of Z but do not know the inventories of individual dealers. Dealers first
announce that they will price according to 2.1 plus a premium (the dealer’s profit).
Insider then chooses a dealer based on this information, before knowing Z. Bertrand
competition will then drive the dealer’s premium to zero. That is, an individual dealer
knows that if he charges higher than what is proposed by (2.1), he will be undercut
by another dealer. Thus, a Bertrand competition will lead to (2.1) for the cost of the
trades of the insider.
Remark 1. Note that the quote given by the competitive dealer that leads to (2.1)
does not violate the limit order protection rule that is mandated by the SEC in the
US. To see this suppose the insider wants to buy X > 0 many units. She is charged
p(X) := 1
X
∫ X+Z
Z
h(y)dy on average for this transaction. If p(X) is bigger than the
best ask, i.e. h(0+), the price priority implies that the limit sell orders at price p(X)
and less must be filled first. Thus, the dealer will first buy h−1(p(X)) many shares
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at a cost of
∫ h−1(p(X))
0
h(y)dy and the remaining X + Z − h−1(p(X)) shares in his
inventory at
∫ X+Z
h−1(p(X)) h(y)dy. This makes his cumulative cost
∫ X+Z
0
h(y)dy and final
profit − ∫ Z
0
h(y)dy coinciding with above calculations.
Thus, in view of (2.1) the expected profit of the insider from a market order of size
x is given by
Ev
[
V x−
∫ x
0
h(Z + y)dy
]
,
where Ev is the expectation operator for the insider with the private information
V = v. Since h is assumed nondecreasing, the first order condition characterises the
unique X∗ achieving the maximum expected profit via V = F (X∗), where
F (x) :=
∫ ∞
−∞
h(x+ z)q(σ, z)dz (2.2)
and q(σ, ·) is the probability density function of a mean-zero Gaussian random variable
with variance σ2. Note that since h∗ is non-decreasing and not constant, F is strictly
increasing and one-to-one. Thus, X∗ = F−1(V ).
We shall also consider the case of multiple insiders trading via the same competitive
dealer and knowing the value of V . Assuming that the dealer charges each insider an
amount proportional to their order size, the expected profit of an individual insider
placing an order of size x is given by
Ev
[
V x− x
U + x
∫ U+x
0
h(Z + y)dy
]
,
where U denotes the aggregate demand of the other insiders. The number of insiders
will be denoted by N .
The first order condition associated with the above optimisation problem of an
individual insider is again given by
V = Ev
[
x
U + x
h(Z + U + x) +
U
((U + x)2
∫ U+x
0
h(Z + u)du
]
.
As every insider has symmetric information and is risk-neutral, the equilibrium de-
mand x∗ for each insider must be the same and satisfy
V = Ev
[
h(Z +Nx∗)
N
+
N − 1
N2x∗
∫ Nx∗
0
h(Z + u)du
]
.
Denoting the total informed demand by X∗, the above can be rewritten as V =
F (X∗), where
F (x) := Ev
[
h(Z + x)
N
+
N − 1
Nx
∫ x
0
h(Z + u)du
]
, (2.3)
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and F (0) is interpreted by continuity to be
Ev
[
h(Z)
N
+
(N − 1)h(Z)
N
]
= Ev[h(Z)].
Moreover, it follows from the monotonicity of h that F defined via (2.3) is strictly
increasing. Also note that (2.3) reduces to (2.2) when N = 1. Thus, we shall always
refer to (2.3) when discussing the optimal strategies of the insiders regardless of the
value of N .
In what follows the total informed demand will be denoted by X and we assume
following Glosten [12] that limit prices are given by ‘tail expectations.’ That is,
denoting the total demand X + Z by Y ,
h(y) =
{
E[V |Y ≥ y], if y > 0;
E[V |Y ≤ y], if y < 0.
}
(2.4)
The value h(0) is not relevant for the subsequent computations and can be freely
chosen to be any value between the best ask h(0+) := limy↓0 h(y) and the best bid
h(0−) := limy↑0 h(y).
The definition (2.4) entails that liquidity suppliers earn zero aggregate profit on
average. Indeed, the expected profit is given by
E
[∫ Y
0
(h(y)− V )dy
]
= E
[
1[Y >0]
∫ Y
0
(h(y)− V )dy + 1[Y <0]
∫ 0
Y
(V − h(y))dy
]
=
∫ ∞
0
E[(h(y)− V )1[Y≥y]]dy +
∫ 0
−∞
E[(V − h(y))1[Y≤y]]dy = 0,
where the last equality is due to the definition of the conditional expectation.
Definition 2.1. The pair (h∗, X∗) is said to be a Glosten equilibrium if h∗ is non-
decreasing and non-constant, X∗ ∈ R and
i) h∗ satisfies (2.4) with Y = X∗ + Z;
ii) X∗ is the profit maximising order size for the insider(s) given h∗. That is,
V = F (X∗), where F is given by (2.3).
The strict monotonicity of F leads to the following result that in particular yields
an explicit formula for the aggregate profit of the insiders.
Proposition 2.1. Let (X∗, h) be an equilibrium and F defined by (2.3). Then, the
following hold:
(1) For any x ∈ R we have
Ev[h(x+ Z)] = F (x) +
N(N − 1)
xN
∫ x
0
(F (x)− F (y))yN−1dy
= F (x) +N(N − 1)
∫ 1
0
(F (x)− F (xy))yN−1dy. (2.5)
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(2) Ev[h(X∗ + Z)] = v when N = 1 and, for N > 1, Ev[h(X∗ + Z)] > v (resp.
Ev[h(X∗ + Z)] < v) if X∗ > 0 (resp. X∗ < 0). More precisely,
Ev[h(X∗ + Z)] = v +N(N − 1)
∫ 1
0
(v − F (yX∗))yN−1dy. (2.6)
(3) The aggregate expected liquidation profit of the insiders conditional on V = v
is given by
pi∗(v) := Ev
[∫ X∗
0
(v − h(y + Z))dy
]
= N
∫ F−1(v)
0
(v − F (y))
(
y
F−1(v)
)N−1
dy
= F−1(v)N
∫ 1
0
(v − F (yF−1(v)))yN−1dy. (2.7)
The expression (2.6) reveals an interesting feature of our model akin to Kyle’s model
in continuous time. Observe that h(X∗ + Z) can be viewed as the last slice that is
traded with the limit order traders. Thus, when there is a monopolistic insider, (2.6)
shows that the final slice is priced at the actual value of V similar to the convergence
of the equilibrium price to the liquidation value of the asset in the continuous time
version of the Kyle model studied in Back [2] for general payoffs. As expected, this
‘convergence’ disappears when the liquidation value of the asses is observed by more
than one insider. Such a competition leads to a more aggressive trading as in Holden
and Subrahmanyam [14] and results in higher (resp. lower) market valuation if the
optimal strategy is to buy (resp. sell).
In practice an important trading benchmark for traders is the implementation short-
fall. Perold [20] defines it as the difference between a ‘paper trading’ benchmark and
the actual trading costs. Assuming that the benchmark is given by the ex-ante valu-
ation E[V ], the associated shortfall in our context can be defined as follows:
Definition 2.2. Let h be a function that defines the limit order book in a Glosten
equilibrium. Then, the implementation shortfall associated with trading x units is
given by
IS(x) :=
1
x
∫ x
0
E[h(Z + y)]dy.
Observe that IS(x) is simply the expected average cost of trading x units. As the
following result shows, it is smaller than the marginal cost F (x), which is given by
the first order condition (2.3).
Proposition 2.2. Let h be a function that defines the limit order book in a Glosten
equilibrium and F (x) be given by the first order condition (2.3). Then,
IS(x) = N
∫ 1
0
F (xy)yN−1dy.
In particular, IS(x) < F (x) for x > 0 and IS(x) > F (x) for x < 0.
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3. Characterisation of Glosten equilibrium
Suppose that (X∗, h∗) is an equilibrium. Writing h instead of h∗ to ease the expo-
sition and using the definition of h when y > 0, we get
h(y) = E[V |X∗ + Z ≥ y] = E[V |F−1(V ) ≥ y − Z] = E[V |V ≥ F (y − Z)].
Similarly, h(y) = E[V |V ≤ F (y − Z)] for y < 0.
Next introduce the right-continuous functions Φ± and Π± via
Φ+(y) := E[V 1[V >y]], Π
+(y) := P (V > y)
Φ−(y) := E[V 1[V≤y]], Π−(y) := P (V ≤ y) = 1− Π+(y).
Note that Φ+(y) +Φ−(y) = E[V ] for all y ∈ R. Moreover, Φ+(y−) = E[V 1[V≥y]] and
Π+(y−) = P (V ≥ y).
Now let us compute h(y) for y > 0:
h(y) = E[V |V ≥ F (y − Z)] = E[V 1[V≥F (y−Z)]]
P (V ≥ F (y − Z))
=
∫∞
−∞Φ
+(F (y − z)−)q(σ, z)dz∫∞
−∞Π
+(F (y − z)−)q(σ, z)dz .
On the other hand, Π+(x) 6= Π+(x−) at most for countably many x. Thus, Φ+(x) =
Φ+(x−) for almost all x and we have for all y > 0
h(y) =
∫∞
−∞Φ
+(F (y − z))q(σ, z)dz∫∞
−∞Π
+(F (y − z))q(σ, z)dz . (3.8)
Similarly, for y < 0
h(y) =
∫∞
−∞Φ
−(F (y − z))q(σ, z)dz∫∞
−∞Π
−(F (y − z))q(σ, z)dz . (3.9)
In order to obtain an equation for F it will be convenient to define, for any continuous
g, the mappings
φ+g (x) :=
∫∞
−∞ Φ
+(g(z))q(σ, x− z)dz∫∞
−∞Π
+(g(z))q(σ, x− z)dz and φ
−
g (x) :=
∫∞
−∞Φ
−(g(z)q(σ, x− z)dz∫∞
−∞Π
−(g(z))q(σ, x− z)dz .
Let us also set
φg(x) := φ
+
g (x)1x≥0 + φ
−
g (x)1x<0. (3.10)
Now, combining (2.3), (3.8) and (3.9) yields an equation for F :
F (x) =
1
N
∫ ∞
−∞
q(σ, x− z)φF (z)dz + N − 1
Nx
∫ x
0
dy
∫ ∞
−∞
q(σ, y − z)φF (z)dz, (3.11)
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If one can change the order of integration in above2, then (3.11) can be rewritten as
F (x) =
∫ ∞
−∞
{
1
N
q(σ, x− z) + N − 1
N
q¯(σ, x, z)
}
φF (z)dz, (3.12)
with
q¯(σ, x, z) := 1x 6=0
1
x
∫ x
0
q(σ, y − z)dy + 1x=0q(σ, z). (3.13)
The preceding calculations show that the existence of a solution for the above integral
equation is a necessary condition for equilibrium. We in fact have the converse, too.
Theorem 3.1. A Glosten equilibrium exists if and only if there exists a function
F : R → R that satisfies (3.11). Given such a solution F , (X∗, h∗) constitutes an
equilibrium, where X∗ = F−1(V ) and h∗ is defined via (3.8) and (3.9).
In view of the above theorem finding an equilibrium boils down to finding a solution
of (3.11). Moreover, equilibrium will be uniquely defined if there exists a unique
solution of (3.11). As usual, solutions of (3.11) will be identified as fixed-points of
a mapping. Before analysing in depth this fixed-point problem, we shal observe few
properties of equilibrium. The following scaling property of F is inherited from the
analogous property of the Gaussian distribution.
Proposition 3.1. Let F (1; ·) be a solution of (3.11) with σ = 1. Then the function
x 7→ F (1; x
σ
) solves (3.11).
Proof.
F
(
1;
x
σ
)
=
1
N
∫ ∞
−∞
q
(
1,
x
σ
− z
)
φF (z)dz + σ
N − 1
Nx
∫ x
σ
0
dy
∫ ∞
−∞
q(1, y − z)φF (z)dz
=
1
N
∫ ∞
−∞
q
(
σ, x− z
)
φF
( z
σ
)
dz +
N − 1
Nx
∫ x
0
dy
∫ ∞
−∞
q
(
1,
y
σ
− z
)
φF (z)dz
=
1
N
∫ ∞
−∞
q
(
σ, x− z
)
φF
( z
σ
)
dz +
N − 1
Nx
∫ x
0
dy
∫ ∞
−∞
q(σ, y − z)φF
(z
y
)
dz.
Similar manipulations yield
φ±F
(z
y
)
=
∫∞
−∞ Φ
±
(
F
(
1; u
y
))
q
(
σ, u− z
)
du∫∞
−∞Π
±
(
F
(
1; u
y
))
q(σ, u− z)du
,
which establishes the claim. 
A straightforward corollary to the above is the following.
Corollary 3.1. Consider the solutions of (3.11) for any σ.
(1) If (3.11) has a unique solution for some σ, it has a unique solution for all σs.
(2) If (3.11) has a unique solution for some σ, F (0) does not depend on σ.
2We shall see later that this is justified when V is bounded from below
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(3) Let h(σ; ·) be the function defined via (3.8) and (3.9), where F is the unique
solution of (3.11) for the given σ. Then, h(σ; x) = h(1; x
σ
) for all x 6= 0.
(4) Suppose (3.11) has a unique solution for some σ and let X∗(σ) be the optimal
order size for the given σ. Then, X∗(σ) = σX∗(1).
In particular, h inherits the same scaling property of F . A simple but striking
consequence of this property concerns the equilibrium bid-ask spread.
Definition 3.1. Let h be a function with right and left limits defining an order book.
The bid-ask spread of the associated order book is given by h(0+)− h(0−).
Corollary 3.2. Suppose that uniqueness holds for the solutions of (3.11). Then,
h(0+)− h(0−) does not depend on σ. Moreover, for fixed x, h(x) is decreasing in σ
for x > 0 and increasing in σ for x < 0.
Thus, the liquidity suppliers charge a bid-ask spread that does not vanish even if
the amount of ‘noise’ trading is excessively large. Moreover, the dependency of the
limit price on σ is not monotone. In particular, h(x) approaches to the supremum
(resp. infimum) of the set of possible values of V for x > 0 (resp. x < 0) when
σ → 0. We shall see these phenomena occurring explicitly in Examples 3.1 and 3.2.
Furthermore, if we consider the limiting behaviour in the other direction as σ →∞,
we observe that the order book gets flatten and converges to the one that yields
transaction costs that are proportional to the order size.
A similar scaling property will hold when the signal distribution possesses a form
of self-similarity, which can be proved by similar methods.
Corollary 3.3. Suppose that uniqueness holds for the solutions of (3.11) and that
V = V (t) for some t > 0 such that the random variables (V (t))t>0 are self-similar in
the sense that V (t)
d
= tαV (1) for some α > 0 for all t > 0. Let Ft be the solution of
(3.11) for V = V (t). Then, Ft = t
αF1. Moreover, the bid-ask spread is increasing in
t.
A typical example of a self-similar random variable is mean-zero Normal random
variable. In this case V (t)
d
= tV (1), where t is the parameter corresponding to stan-
dard deviation. Similarly, V (t)
d
= tV (1), when V (t) corresponds to an exponential
random variable with mean (hence, standard deviation) t. The above corollary there-
fore shows that the bid ask spread gets bigger as the variance of the information signal
gets higher, indicating that the liquidity suppliers charge a bigger bid-ask spread when
the informational asymmetry gets bigger.
Another consequence of the uniqueness of solutions of (3.11) is that the aggregate
expected profit of the insiders vanishes as N →∞.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose that −∞ < m < M < ∞, there exists a unique solution
FN of (3.11) for each N ≥ 1, and uniqueness holds for the solutions of
F (x) =
1
x
∫ x
0
dy
∫ ∞
−∞
q(σ, y − z)φF (z)dz. (3.14)
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Assume further that Π+ is continuous. Then F∞ = limN→∞ FN exists and solves
(3.14). Moreover, limN→∞ pi∗(v) = 0, where pi∗ is the aggregate expected profit as
defined in (2.7).
Definition 3.2. V is said to be symmetric if V and −V have the same distribution.
That is, Π+(y−) = Π−(−y) for all y.
Proposition 3.3. Suppose that V is symmetric and there exists a unique solution
F to (3.11). Then F is symmetric, i.e. F (x) = −F (−x) for all x. Moreover, any
symmetric solution of (3.11) is also a solution of
F (x) =
1
N
∫ ∞
0
q0(σ, x− z)φ+F (z)dz +
N − 1
Nx
∫ x
0
dy
∫ ∞
0
q0(σ, y − z)φ+F (z)dz, (3.15)
where q0(σ, x, z) := q(σ, x− z)− q(σ, x+ z).
Proof. Observe that −Φ+(y−) = E[−V 1[V≥y]] = E[−V 1[−V≤−y]] = E[V 1[V≤−y]] =
Φ−(−y). Thus, utilising the fact that Φ+ and Π+ differ from their left limits at most
at countably many points and q is symmetric around zero, we obtain∫ ∞
−∞
q(σ,−x− z)φF (z)dz =
∫ 0
−∞
dz q(σ, x− z)
∫∞
−∞ Φ
+(F (−u))q(σ, z − u)du∫∞
−∞Π
+(F (−u))q(σ, z − u)du
+
∫ ∞
0
dz q(σ, x− z)
∫∞
−∞Φ
−(F (−u))q(σ, z − u)du∫∞
−∞Π
−(F (−u))q(σ, z − u)du
= −
∫ 0
−∞
dz q(σ, x− z)
∫∞
−∞Φ
−(−F (−u))q(σ, z − u)du∫∞
−∞Π
−(−F (−u))q(σ, z − u)du
−
∫ ∞
0
dz q(σ, x− z)
∫∞
−∞Φ
+(−F (−u))q(σ, z − u)du∫∞
−∞Π
+(−F (−u))q(σ, z − u)du
= −
∫ ∞
−∞
q(σ,−x− z)φG(z)d,
where G(x) := −F (−x). Moreover,
−1
x
∫ −x
0
dy
∫ ∞
−∞
q(σ, y − z)φF (z)dz = 1
x
∫ x
0
dy
∫ ∞
−∞
q(σ,−y − z)φF (z)dz
= −1
x
∫ x
0
dy
∫ ∞
−∞
q(σ, y − z)φG(z)dz.
Thus, −G is also a solution of (3.11), which establishes the first assertion. The second
assertion follows from a change of variable in (3.11) as above and using the assumed
symmetry of F . 
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Example 3.1. Suppose that P (V = 1) = P (V = −1) = 1
2
. Then, the unique
symmetric solution of (3.11) is defined by
F (x) =
1
N
∫ ∞
0
q0(σ, x, z)dz +
N − 1
Nx
∫ x
0
dy
∫ ∞
0
dzq0(σ, y, z), x ≥ 0.
In this case it is easily seen that in equilibrium X∗ =∞ (resp. x∗ = −∞) if V = 1
(resp. V = −1). Moreover, h∗(y) = 1[y>0] − 1[y<0].
Although the insiders’ optimal market order is to buy or sell an infinite amount,
their profit remains finite. Indeed, when V = 1, the aggregate expected profit is given
by ∫ ∞
0
E1(1− h(Z + y))dy = 2E1
(∫ ∞
0
1[Z<−y]dy
)
= 2
∫ ∞
0
P (Z > y)dy
= 2E[Z+] = E[|Z|] = σ
√
2
pi
,
where Z+ = max{Z, 0} and the second line is due to the fact that P (Z > y) =
P (Z+ > y). Note that the total profit is independent of N .
Example 3.2. Consider the case P (V = −1) = P (V = 0) = P (V = 1) = 1
3
. Then,
similar considerations as above should yield F (∞) = 1 and F (−∞) = −1. Moreover,
symmetry considerations must lead to F (0) = 0, which suggests that the insider does
not trade when V = 0. Indeed, the unique solution of (3.11) is given by
F (x) =
1
N
∫ ∞
0
q0(σ, x, z)
1
1 + P (Z ≥ z)dz +
N − 1
Nx
∫ x
0
dy
∫ ∞
0
dzq0(σ, y, z)
1
1 + P (Z ≥ z) .
Differently from Example 3.1, the order book will not be flat since the insider does not
trade when V = 0. One can obtain h∗ via (3.9) and (3.8). Alternatively, for y > 0
h(y) =
E[V 1[X∗(V )+Z≥y]]
P (X∗(V ) + Z ≥ y) =
P (V = 1)
P (V = 1) + P (V = 0, Z ≥ y) =
P (V = 1)
P (V = 1) + P (V = 0)P (Z ≥ y)
=
1
1 + P (Z ≥ y) ,
where the first equality follows from the fact that X∗(V ) is infinite when V = −1 or
1, and the third follows from the independence of V and Z. Similarly, for y < 0,
h(y) = − 1
1 + P (Z ≤ y) .
In particular, the bid-ask spread is given by h(0+) − h(0−) = 4
3
, independent of the
noise volume and of N .
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3.1. Existence of Glosten equilibrium. We shall denote the interior of the sup-
port of the random variable V by (m,M), where −∞ ≤ m < M ≤ ∞, and define on
the support of V
Ψ±(y) :=
Φ±(y)
Π±(y)
(3.16)
so that Ψ+(y) = E[V |V > y] and Ψ−(y) = E[V |V ≤ y].
We impose the following condition on the function F to ensure that the integral
equation (3.11) is well-defined and changing the order of integration in (3.12) is jus-
tified.
Assumption 3.1. ∫ 0
−∞
φ−F (z)q(σ, z)dz > −∞.
Observe that the above is automatically satisfied if V is bounded from below in
view of (A.38). Moreover, if F is a continuous function satisfying (3.11) and V
is symmetric, it satisfies the above assumption in view of Proposition 3.3 and the
finiteness of F .
One of the useful consequences of the above assumption is the strict monotonicity
of solutions of (3.11).
Lemma 3.1. Let F be a continuous non-decreasing solution of (3.11) or (3.14) sat-
isfying Assumption 3.1. Then, limx→∞ F (x) = M and limx→−∞ F (x) = m. Conse-
quently, F is strictly increasing.
Theorem 3.2. Suppose −∞ < m < M < ∞. Then, there exists a Glosten equilib-
rium.
Under the hypotheses of Theorem 3.2 it is clear that m < F (x) < M for x ∈ R.
However, in view of the bounds given by (A.37) and (A.38) it is possible to obtain
sharper bounds on any solution of (3.11).
Theorem 3.3. Suppose −∞ < m < M < ∞ and let Ψ± be as in (3.16). Then the
following statements are valid.
(1) There exists a maximal nondecreasing solution3 to
R(x) =
∫ ∞
0
dz
{
1
N
q(σ, x− z) + N − 1
N
q¯(σ, x, z)
}∫ ∞
−∞
Ψ+(R(y))q(σ, z − y)dy
+E[V ]
∫ 0
−∞
dz
{
1
N
q(σ, x− z) + N − 1
N
q¯(σ, x, z)
}
. (3.17)
Moreover, this maximal solution is not constant and any solution of (3.11) is
bounded from above by this maximal solution.
3R is a maximal nondecreasing solution if R(x) ≥ r(x) for all x ∈ R, where r is any other nonde-
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(2) There exists a minimal nondecreasing solution4 to
l(x) = E[V ]
∫ ∞
0
dz
{
1
N
q(σ, x− z) + N − 1
N
q¯(σ, x, z)
}
(3.18)
+
∫ 0
−∞
dz
{
1
N
q(σ, x− z) + N − 1
N
q¯(σ, x, z)
∫ ∞
−∞
Ψ−(l(y))q(σ, z − y)dy
}
.
Moreover, this minimal solution is not constant and any solution of (3.11) is
bounded from below by this minimal solution.
We shall see in the next section that F behaves like R (resp. l) as x → ∞ (resp.
x→ −∞).
4. Market impact asymptotics
In this section we are interested in the market impact associated with large orders.
More precisely, we will be computing the asymptotics of the marginal cost of trades,
which is given by the function F . As we shall see later, the asymptotic form of F will
coincide (up to a scaling factor) with that of implementation shortfall IS. We will
also be able to compute the tail asymptotics of the distribution of the total demand
in equilibrium.
Definition 4.1. A function g : (0,∞) → (0,∞) is said to be regularly varying of
index ρ at ∞ if
lim
λ→∞
g(λx)
g(λ)
= xρ, ∀x > 0.
Analogously, a function g : (−∞, 0)→ (0,∞) is said to be regularly varying of index
ρ at −∞ if g(−x) is regularly varying of index ρ at ∞.
We shall first start with the asymptotics of solutions of (3.17) and (3.18) which will
later allow us to compute the asymptotics of interest.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that N > 1, −∞ < m < M <∞, and Π+ has a continuous
derivative. Then, the following statements are valid:
(1) Define Ψ+x (M) := limx→M
d
dx
Ψ+(x) and set G := M − R, where R is any
nondecreasing solution of (3.17). Then, G is regularly varying of index ρ+ at
∞, where
ρ+ =
Ψ+x (M)− 1
1− Ψ+x (M)
N
. (4.19)
4l is a minimal nondecreasing solution if l(x) ≤ L(x) for all x ∈ R, where L is any other nondecreasing
solution.
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(2) Define Ψ−x (m) := limx→m
d
dx
Ψ−(x) and set G := l −m, where l is any nonde-
creasing solution of (3.18). Then, G is regularly varying of index ρ− at −∞,
where
ρ− =
Ψ−x (m)− 1
1− Ψ−x (m)
N
. (4.20)
Remark 2. Observe that when M is finite,
Ψ+x (M) = lim
x→M
M −Ψ+(x)
M − x ≤ limx→M
M − x
M − x = 1.
Similarly, Ψ−x (m) ≤ 1 if m is finite.
The above shows that R (resp. l) is slowly varying at∞ (resp. −∞) if Ψ+x (M) = 1
(resp. Ψ−x (M) = 1). We can obtain a better estimate of how slow its variation is
under a further assumption on Ψ±.
Theorem 4.2. Assume that N > 1, −∞ < m < M <∞, Π+ has a continuous deriv-
ative and Ψ+x (M) and Ψ
−
x (m) are as in Theorem 4.1. Then, the following statements
are valid:
(1) Suppose that Ψ+x (M) = 1 and there exist an integer n ≥ 1 and a real constant
k ∈ (0,∞) such that
lim
x→M
Ψ+(x)− x
(M − x)n+1 =
1
k
.
Then, the following asymptotics5 hold:
M − R(x) ∼
(
N
N − 1
n
k
)− 1
n
(log x)−
1
n , x→∞, (4.21)
where R is any solution of (3.17).
(2) Suppose that Ψ−x (m) = 1 and there exist an integer n ≥ 1 and a real constant
k ∈ (0,∞) such that
lim
x→m
x−Ψ−(x)
(x−m)n+1 =
1
k
.
Then
l(x)−m ∼
(
N
N − 1
n
k
)− 1
n
(log |x|)− 1n , x→ −∞, (4.22)
where l is any solution of (3.18).
Corollary 4.1. Assume that N > 1, −∞ < m < M < ∞, Π+ has a continu-
ous derivative and Ψ+x (M) and Ψ
−
x (m) are as in Theorem 4.1. Then, the following
statements are valid:
5We write f(x) ∼ g(x), x→ ±∞ if limx→±∞ f(x)g(x) = 1.
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(1) Suppose that there exist an integer n ≥ 0 and a real constant k ∈ (0,∞) such
that
lim
x→M
Ψ+(x)− x
(M − x)n+1 =
1
k
.
Then, Π+(R) is regularly varying at ∞ of index
− Ψ
+
x (M)
1− Ψ+x (M)
N
,
where R is any solution of (3.17).
(2) Suppose that there exist an integer n ≥ 0 and a real constant k ∈ (0,∞) such
that
lim
x→M
x−Ψ−(x)
(x−m)n+1 =
1
k
.
Then, Π−(l) is regularly varying at −∞ of index
− Ψ
−
x (m)
1 − Ψ−x (m)
N
,
where l is any solution of (3.18).
Remark 3. Note that if Ψ+x (M) 6= 1, we have
lim
x→M
Ψ+(x)− x
M − x = 1−Ψ
+
x (M),
implying n = 0 and k−1 = 1 − Ψ+(M) in Part 1) of Corollary 4.1. An analogous
consideration applies to the second part.
The results above now allow us to compute the asymptotics of solutions of (3.11).
Theorem 4.3. Assume that N > 1, −∞ < m < M < ∞, Π+ has a continuous
derivative and Ψ+x (M) and Ψ
−
x (m) are as in Theorem 4.1. Let F be any solution of
(3.11). Then, the following statements are valid:
(1) M − F is regularly varying of index ρ+ at ∞, where ρ+ is given by (4.19).
Moreover, if Ψ+x (M) = 1 and there exist an integer n ≥ 1 and a real constant
k ∈ (0,∞) such that
lim
x→M
Ψ+(x)− x
(M − x)n+1 =
1
k
,
the following asymptotics hold:
M − F (x) ∼
(
N
N − 1
n
k
)− 1
n
(log x)−
1
n , x→∞. (4.23)
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(2) F −m is regularly varying of index ρ− at −∞, where ρ− is given by (4.20).
Moreover, if Ψ−x (m) = 1, and there exist an integer n ≥ 1 and a real
constant k ∈ (0,∞) such that
lim
x→m
x−Ψ−(x)
(x−m)n+1 =
1
k
,
then
F (x)−m ∼
(
N
N − 1
n
k
)− 1
n
(log |x|)− 1n , x→ −∞. (4.24)
Remark 4. Upon integrating by parts we arrive at
Ψ+(x)− x
(M − x)n+1 =
∫M
x
Π+(y)dy
Π+(x)(M − x)n+1 .
Now suppose that Π+(x) =
∫M
x
p(y)dy for some differentiable p such that
− p(x)
p′(x)
∼ 1
k
(M − x)n+1 as x→M,
for some k > 0 and n ≥ 1. A straightforward application of L’Hospital rule shows
that
lim
x→M
Π+(x)
p(x)(M − x)n+1 =
1
k
,
which in turn implies
lim
x→∞
∫M
x
Π+(y)dy
Π+(x)(M − x)n+1 =
1
k
.
For instance, if
p(x) ∝ (M − x)β exp
(
− Σ
(M − x)n
)
,
for some β ∈ R, Σ > 0, and n ≥ 1, we deduce that
lim
x→M
Ψ+(x)− x
(M − x)n+1 =
1
nΣ
.
We also have the exact analogue of Corollary 4.1 that can be proven by exactly the
same arguments.
Corollary 4.2. Assume that N > 1, −∞ < m < M < ∞, Π+ has a continuous
derivative and Ψ+x (M) and Ψ
−
x (m) are as in Theorem 4.1. Let F be any solution of
(3.11). Then, the following statements are valid:
(1) Suppose that there exist an integer n ≥ 0 and a real constant k ∈ (0,∞) such
that
lim
x→M
Ψ+(x)− x
(M − x)n+1 =
1
k
.
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Then, Π+(F ) is regularly varying at ∞ of index
− Ψ
+
x (M)
1− Ψ+x (M)
N
.
(2) Suppose that there exist an integer n ≥ 0 and a real constant k ∈ (0,∞) such
that
lim
x→M
x−Ψ−(x)
(x−m)n+1 =
1
k
.
Then, Π−(F ) is regularly varying at −∞ of index
− Ψ
−
x (m)
1 − Ψ−x (m)
N
.
Remark 5. Although Corollary 4.2 appears rather technical, it uncovers the distri-
bution of the total volume traded in equilibrium. Indeed, for x > 0
P (X∗ > x) = P (F−1(V ) > x) = P (V > F (x)) = Π+(F (x)).
Thus, under the hypothesis of Corollary 4.2, the tail distribution of equilibrium X∗ is
regularly varying at infinity. That is,
P (X∗ > x) = x−ζ
+
s(x),
where s is a slowly varying function and
ζ+ :=
Ψ+x (M)
1− Ψ+x (M)
N
Moreover, since the aggregate order is given by Y ∗ = X∗ + Z and Z and V are
independent, we have for y > 0
P (Y ∗ > y) =
∫ ∞
−∞
dzP (X∗ > y − z)q(σ, z) =
∫ ∞
−∞
dzP (X∗ > z)q(σ, y − z),
which can easily be shown to be regularly varying at infinity with the same index.
Thus,
P (Y ∗ > y) = y−ζ
+
s(y), y > 0, (4.25)
for some regularly varying s. In particular, if V has light tails, i.e. Ψ+x (M) = 1,
P (Y ∗ > y) is regularly varying of index − N
N−1 .
Analogous computations yield for the sell side
P (Y ∗ < −y) = y−ζ−s(y), y > 0, (4.26)
where
ζ− :=
Ψ−x (m)
1− Ψ−x (m)
N
.
We have seen in Proposition 2.2 that the implementation shortfall is smaller than
F . In view of Theorem 4.3 we have a more precise relationship for large x.
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Corollary 4.3. Assume that N > 1, −∞ < m < M < ∞, Π+ has a continuous
derivative, and let (h∗, X∗) be an equilibrium. Suppose that F ∗ is given by (2.3), with
h being replaced by h∗. Then,
M − IS∗(x) ∼ N
N + ρ+
(M − F ∗(x)), x→∞, (4.27)
IS∗(x)−m ∼ N
N + ρ−
(F ∗(x)−m), x→ −∞, (4.28)
where ρ+ and ρ− are as in Theorem 4.1.
Corllary 4.3 shows that for large N implementation shortfall and the marginal cost
of trading are almost indistinguishable. This is even more pronounced when M − F
(resp. F − m) is slowly varying, i.e. ρ+ = 0 (resp. ρ− = 0). Observe that IS can
be estimated from market data using the open limit order book governed by h, while
the computation of F depends also on the estimate of N .
Remark 6. We have focused in this section the asymptotics of F and IS. However,
one also naturally wonders the asymptotic shape of the limit order book. Using our
framework it is easy to show that F and h behave similarly for large values. Indeed,
recalling the measure ν defined in (B.50), we formally obtain
lim
x→∞
M − h(x)
M − F (x) = limx→∞
∫ ∞
−∞
ν(x, 1, dy)
M −Ψ+(F (xy))
M − F (x)
= Ψ+x (M)1
ρ+ = Ψ+x (M),
using the mean value theorem and the continuity of the derivative of Ψ+ together with
the fact that the F is regularly varying with index ρ+ since the measure ν(x, 1, dy)
converges to the point mass at 1 as x → ∞. In particular, the order book h is also
regularly varying with the same index ρ+.
5. Numerical studies
This section is devoted to description of results obtained in previous version via a
naive numerical search for a fixed point: Starting with an F0, we compute Fn+1 =
TFn until the distance between successive iterations become negligibly small, where
TF corresponds to the right side of (3.11). Although the proofs of the statements
concerning the existence of equilibrium and its asymptotics relied on a boundedness
assumption, we shall also presents the solutions of the fixed point problems associated
with equilibria with unbounded signals.
Since σ can be absorbed into the units for measuring equity in view of (3.1), we
will set σ = 1 in all numerical tests with no loss of generality in this section.
The iteration converges exponentially for all cases considered below. We illustrate
the convergence in Figure 1 by showing the uniform distance d(gn, gn+1) between
successive iterations for log-normal signals with N = 25.
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Uniform convergence: log-normal, N=25
Figure 1. The uniform distance between successive iterations falls off
exponentially with the iteration number
In practice, the signals distribution is at least partly known to practitioners since
it can be inferred from the options montage and the event calendar. For example, an
insider may have advance knowledge of the result of clinical trials of a new treatment
from a biopharmaceutical company, or the insider may have been tipped about a
number to be released in a scheduled earnings call. The signals distributions in these
two examples are quite different. In the case of clinical trial results, the signal is drawn
from a bounded distribution since the outcome is bounded by total success and total
failure. On the other hand, earnings surprises can be arbitrarily large. Earnings calls
can be priced in a naive jump-diffusion model by assuming the surprise is drawn
from a log-normal distribution; the jump variance is estimated by comparing the
at-the-money implied volatility(ATMIV) for the two nearest options expirations, as
proposed by Dubinsky and Johannes [7].
The shape of market impact as a function of trade size is important to practitioners
to address capacity and position sizing. Various functional forms have been explored
in the literature (see, e.g., [4], [11], [21] and [26]), including
√
X and log(1 + aX).
Rejecting either of these forms empirically is challenging due to three practical dif-
ficulties: (1) the spread and market impact terms are collinear for small orders, (2)
signal-to-noise ratios are weak for executions that take a small percentage of mar-
ket volume, and (3) for very large trades, order sizes are often increased if liquidity
is available, or reduced if liquidity is hard to find, leading to bias in the data. In
absence of clear empirical evidence, theoretical predictions for the shape of market
impact provide valuable insight into how trading costs scale with trade size. One
testable conclusion from this paper is that market impact should be different ahead
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of an event with an unusual distribution of signals, if market makers believe that an
informed trader may have advance knowledge of the signal.
We consider first the case of bounded signals that was the focus of the previous
section.
5.1. Bounded signals.
5.1.1. Truncated Gaussian distribution.
If signals are drawn from the truncated Gaussian distribution with density p(v) =
1
erf( M√
2Σ
)
√
2piΣ
e−
v2
2Σ for v ∈ [−M,M ], the numerical solution for equilibrium F converges
to the upper bound as M − F (x) ∼ 1/xN−12N in accordance with the predictions of
Theorem 4.3. We show F and the theoretical prediction for its asymptotic behavior
in Figure 2.
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2.07/(1+0.66x)0.48
equilibrium
Figure 2. The asymptotic behavior of F is shown for the case where
signals are drawn from a truncated Gaussian distribution
5.1.2. Logit-normal distribution.
If price is a probablility-weighted average over two possible outcomes v± = p0 ± 1,
where the probability is a sigmoidal function of a Gaussian generator potential g
as p = 1
1+e−g , the signals distribution is the logit-normal distribution with density
p(v) =
√
2
piΣ
e−
ln2( 1−v1+v )
2Σ
1−v2 . This distribution has support in [−1, 1].
We show the equlibrium solution for F , the order book h and the implementation
shortfall for logit-normal signals, in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Equilibrium impact and shortfall for logit-normal signals
for the case of an insider (N = 1)
Note that the logit normal distribution does not satisfy the hypothesis of Theorem
4.3. Thus, our theory cannot predict the asymptotics of F for this distribution. How-
ever, the following formal arguments yield the asymptotics that seem to be verified
by the numerical experiments. Observe that for x >> σ, 2.3 becomes
F (x) ≈ 1
N
h(x) +
N − 1
Nx
∫ x
0
h(u)du (5.29)
It follows that F (x) + xF ′(x) ≈ h(x) + 1
N
xh′(x). Moreover, for large values of x,
we roughly have h(x) ≈ Ψ+(F (x)). Let us consider the large N limit and drop the
1/N term. Using the approximation erfc(x) ≈ e−x2
x
√
pi
(1 − 1
2x2
) and expanding to first
order in 1/ log(x) we find that asymptotically
xF ′ =
Σ(1− F )
log(1− F ) ,
whihc yields F → 1− e−k
√
log(x)
The numerical solution shown in Figure 4 for N = 25 is consistent with this as-
ymptotic form.
5.2. Unbounded signals. In what follows, we place emphasis on unbounded signals;
that is, when the support of V is unbounded. Although we do not have a theoretical
justification for the existence of a solution for (3.11) in the case of unbounded signals,
we were able to arrive at numerical solutions via the above numerical search.
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Figure 4. Convergence to the upper bound for M = 1 when signals
are drawn from a logit-normal distribution and shared with N = 25
traders.
The asymptotic behavior of F (x) for large signals will depend on the tail behaviour
of the distribution of V . Assuming the interchange of limits and integrals in the proof
of Theorem 4.3, we can show that
γ(x) =
Ψ+x (∞)
N
γ(x) +
N − 1
Nx
Ψ+x (∞)
∫ x
0
γ(y)dy, x > 0,
where γ(x) := limα→∞
F (αx)
F (α)
in case of M = ∞. Solution of the above equation
immediately yields that, for N > 1, F is regularly varying at ∞ of order ρ+, where
ρ+ =
Ψ+x (∞)− 1
1− Ψ+x (∞)
N
. (5.30)
Observe that when M = ∞, Ψ+x (∞) ≥ 1 in contrast to the bounded case, where
Ψ+x (M) ≤ 1. Since ρ+ must be non-negative, this places the restriction on N :
N ≥ Ψ+x (∞) (5.31)
Thus, we conjecture that (5.31) is a necessary condition for the existence of equilib-
rium when M =∞. Observe that for a fat tailed unbounded distribution, Ψ+x (∞) >
1. Thus, a sufficient competition among insiders is necessary for the equilibrium to
exist. Such a condition is always satisfied in the bounded case since Ψ+x (M) ≤ 1 for
M <∞.
As in the bounded case F will be slowly varying at infinity when Ψ+x (∞) = 1. In
this case, if we assume
lim
x→∞
(Ψ+(x)− x)xn−1 = 1
k
(5.32)
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Table 1. Distributions with power-law impact
Distribution Density ρ+
Beta prime xλ−1(1 + x)−(λ+α)
(
N−1
N
α− 1)−1
Fre´chet (x− β)−(1+α) exp
{
− (x−β
s
)−α} (N−1
N
α− 1)−1
Lomax
(
1 + x
λ
)−(α+1) (N−1
N
α− 1)−1
Pareto x−(α+1)
(
N−1
N
α− 1)−1
Student
(
1 + x
2
α
)−(α+1)/2 (
N−1
N
α− 1)−1
In above probability densities are given up to a scaling factor and implicit constraints are enforced
to ensure they are well defined with finite mean. Moreover, N > α
α−1 in all of the above.
Table 2. Distributions with logarithmic impact
Distribution Density Asymptotics
Exponential exp(−λx) N
λ(N−1) log x
Gaussian exp(−(x− µ)2/Σ)
√
2ΣN
N−1
√
log x
Inverse Gaussian x−3/2 exp
(
−λ(x−µ)2
2µ2x
)
2Nµ2
λ(N−1) log x
Normal Inverse Gaussian K1(λζ(x))
piζ(x)
exp(δγ + β(x− µ) N
(N−1)(λ+β−1) log x
Weibull xd−1 exp(−λpxp)
(
N
λp(N−1)
)1/p
(log x)1/p
In above probability densities are given up to a scaling factor and implicit constraints are enforced
to ensure they are well defined with finite mean. Moreover, ζ(x) := δ2 + (x− µ)2 for the Normal
Inverse Gaussian distributiuon.
for some k > 0 and n ≥ 1, formal calculations yield
F (x) ∼
(
N
N − 1
n
k
) 1
n
(log x)
1
n , x→∞. (5.33)
Tables 1 and 2 summarise the predicted asymptotics for a class of distributions
commonly used in the literature and practice.
5.2.1. Gaussian signals. We assume that the mean of V equals 0. The numerical
solution is shown in Figure 5 together with the
√
log x asymptotic behavior.
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Figure 5. Functional form of the equilibrium for Gaussian signals, for
N = 25
5.2.2. Log-normal signals. For a log-normal distribution, the mean is an arbitrary
scale factor which we set to 1 and, thus, the density is p(v) = 1√
2piΣv
e−
(ln(v)+Σ/2)2
2Σ .
We choose a large signal variance
√
Σ = 10% in our numerical experiments below,
illustrative of an earnings announcement for a high-volatility name. Moreover, we
translate the distribution by 1 so that the mean is 0. The equilibrium solutions for
h, F and IS are shown for various values of N in Figure 6.
Observe that the equilibrium F is not symmetric around its mean: a market maker
who is short the stock runs the risk of unbounded losses, whereas for a long position
the maximum loss is always bounded since price cannot fall below zero.
The log-normal distribution does not satisfy the conditions of Theorem 4.3. Thus,
we do not have a theoretical prediction for the asymptotic market impact. However,
we find numerically that the implementation shortfall fits
√
log(1 + axδ). Asymp-
totically, both the shortfall and F are consistent with
√
log(x). We note that the
large-size behavior
√
log(x) is more concave than both the square root commonly
used by practitioners and also the log(1 + x) model that has been suggested in some
empirical studies, e.g. [4].
The asymmetry between positive and negative signals is clearly visible in the figure
as we chose a rather large signal with a standard deviation of 10%.
The aggregate profit is a decreasing function of the number of informed investors
and we show the profit as a function of trade size below for various values of N
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in Figure 8. Moreover, Figure 9 shows how the spread depends on the number of
informed investors.
The greater positive tail mass for the log-normal signals implies that large positive
signals yield a greater profit than for Gaussian signals with the same Σ, and vice-versa,
negative signals yield a smaller profit in the log-normal case (Figure 10).
5.2.3. Student signals. We explore the effect of fat tails in the signal distribution
next. We consider the case where signals drawn from a Student t-distribution with
α = 3, p(v) ∼ 1
(1+ v
2
Σ
)2
. This is reminiscent of some empirical studies such as Plerou
[27]. However, we note that we are assuming a Student distribution of arithmetic
returns. The power-law tail of geometric returns in Plerou’s study implies an infinite
expected price.
In view of Table 1 the expected asymptotics is F (x) ∼ X1/(α−1− αN ). Moreover, our
conjecture predicts no equilibrium when N ≤ α
α−1 =
3
2
. Indeed, no numerical solution
for F can be found when N = 1. The equilibrium asymptotically parabolic for N = 2
(theoretical ρ+ = 2), linear for N = 3 (theoretical ρ+ = 1) and concave for N ≥ 4.
The numerical solutions are shown in Figure 11. ForN = 25, the asymptotic exponent
is F (x) ∼ x25/47 according to our theory. The numerical solution is compared to this
prediction in Figure 12.
The case of power-law tailed signal distributions was considered previously by
Farmer et al. in the case of perfect competition between insiders [8]. One can view
their model as the limiting case of the one considered herein as N →∞ in case of a
Pareto-tailed distribution with exponent 3.
5.2.4. Exponential signals. We are not aware of any situation that gives rise to an
exponential distribution for an asset’s price6. However, the case is of interest to
illustrate the effect of extreme asymmetry. For exponential signals, the probability
density function is given by p(v) = 1
λ
e−λv for v > 0. We take λ = 1 and translate the
distribution by 1 so that the mean equals 0 for the numerical solutions. The numerics
indicate that the equilibrium is asymptotically linear for the case of monopolistic
insider and concave in case of competitive investors, as shown in Figure 13.
6A possible exception is Kou and Wang [15] who consider an asymmetric double exponential distri-
bution for jumps in the asset price
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Figure 6. Equilibrium solutions for log-normal signals for the cases
of an insider (N = 1), and shared signals with N = 2, N = 25
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Figure 7. Functional form of the equilibrium for Log-normal signals,
for N = 25. The log-normal distribution is not symmetric and this re-
sults in a notable difference between the positive and negative branches
for cost as a function of trade size.
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Figure 8. Aggregate investor profit per share for Log-normal signals
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Figure 11. Equilibrium solutions for Student signals for the cases
N = 2, N = 3 and N = 25
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Figure 13. Equilibrium solutions for Exponential signals for the cases
N = 1, N = 2 and N = 25
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6. Same-price liquidation
Up to now, we assumed that the dealer had an initial position Z and liquidated
his total position X + Z after trading with the insider via the limit order book and
argued that a Bertrand competition leads to a price to the insider given by (2.1). An
alternative framework also of interest to practitioners is one where portfolio managers
and noise traders submit their orders to an aggregator (institutional trading desk),
which merges the orders into a block (“metaorder”, in the literature), liquidates
X + Z for some average price, and allocates shares with the same average price to
noise traders and insiders. We refer to this framework as same-price liquidation. The
expected profit of the insiders in this case is
Ev
[
V X − X
X + Z
∫ X+Z
0
h(y)dy
]
. (6.34)
In this case the corresponding first order condition for the maximisation problem
is given by V = F (X∗), where
F (x) = Ev
[
x
Z + x
h(Z + x)− h¯(Z + x)
N
+ h¯(Z + x)
]
,
where h¯(x) = 1
x
∫ x
0
h(y)dy and h is given by the tail expectation as above.
The problem with this first order condition is that it is not clear whether it yields
a maximum as F defined above is not necessarily increasing, i.e. we may not have a
concave function to maximise in contrast to the problem studied in previous section.
However, if one assumes that F is increasing and obtains the corresponding in-
tegral equation, one can still get a fixed point. Moreover, our numerical solutions
always suggest an increasing solution yielding a ‘numerical’ proof of the existence of
equilibrium.
The solutions are similar in form and share the same asymptotic behaviour for
both bounded and unbounded signal distributions. We show as an example the case
of log-normal signals in Figure 14.
Figure 15 compares the same-price liquidation model to the dealer inventory model
in the case of Gaussian signals. The dotted lines represent the same-price liquidation
equilibria. Market impact is somewhat greater with same-price liquidation than for
the dealer inventory model, for N > 1. For the insider case, the two are essentially
identical.
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Figure 14. Equilibrium solutions for same-price liquidation with log-
normal signals for the cases of an insider (N = 1), and shared signals
with N = 2, N = 25
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7. Conclusion
In this article, we explored how private information is transferred into the market
price through a limit order book. Since empirical data on very large trades is sparse
and often biased, it is important to develop a theoretical understanding of the pro-
cess in order to discriminate between various proposals for the shape of the impact
function.
We proposed an asymmetric information based equilibrium model where informed
investors draw a signal and send their orders to a dealer with an initial position who
executes at the net cost to liquidate the aggregate amount against a limit order book.
Unlike the earlier static equilibrium models developed for limit order markets, the
informed traders’ positions are determined endogenously in equilibrium. We showed
that solutions exist in the case of bounded signals and discussed properties of the
equilibrium including the asymptotic behavior of the implementation shortfall for
large trades.
Our results provide the micro-foundations for a large number of empirical findings
including those on price impact and volume. We found that market impact is asymp-
totically a power of trade size if the signal has fat tails, whereas the impact becomes
of the form (log x)1/p for some p > 0 for lighter tails.
Our numerical experiments show that our results remain valid for unbounded sig-
nals with analogous impact asymptotics. Moreover, for fat-tailed signal distributions,
an equilibrium only exists if there is a sufficient amount of competition. In the partic-
ular case of Student distribution, if the tail exponent is α = 3, there is no equilibrium
in the case of a monopolistic insider, and the shape of market impact tends to a square
root in the limit where the number of informed investors is large, N →∞. Although
we do not have an analytic proof, the bid-ask spread seems to be an increasing and
bounded function of the number of informed investors.
A relevant and arguably more realistic extension of our framework while still re-
maining in a static setting is to consider the scenario in which the insiders receive
different but possibly correlated signals regarding the liquidation value. On the other
hand, due to our assumption that the insiders’ orders arrive simultaneously to the
dealer, the optimisation problem of each insider requires the solution of a nonlinear
filtering problem even in the case of Gaussian signals. Our present technology is not
yet able to deal with such complications and, therefore, we postpone the discussion
of this extension to subsequent research.
In reality limit order markets are dynamic and thus the order books change over
time reflecting the changes in market parameters. The analytic characterisation of the
equilibrium in the current framework in terms of the fixed point of an integral operator
makes us optimistic regarding an extension of the current framework to a dynamic
setting in continuous time. However, continuous trading brings extra flexibilities to
portfolio choice - including the option to place a market or limit order at each trade -
resulting in a more complicated model. This extension, though extremely interesting,
will thus be left for future research.
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Appendix A. Auxiliary results
Lemma A.1. Ψ+ and Ψ− are non-decreasing on the support of V .
Proof. Suppose x < y. Note that Ψ+ is non-decreasing if
E[V 1[V >y]]P (V > x)−E[V 1[V >x]]P (V > y) ≥ 0.
Indeed, the left side of the above equals
E[(V − y)1[V >y]]P (V > x)−E[(V − y)1[V >x]]P (V > y)
= E[(V − y)1[V >y]] (P (V > x)− P (V > y))− E[(V − y)1[x<V≤y]]P (V > y),
which is non-negative since V − y ≤ 0 on the set [x < V ≤ y].
The second assertion is proved analogously. 
Lemma A.2. Let g : R → R be a continuous function and u+ (resp. u−) be the
unique solution of
ut + σ
2uxx = 0, u(1, x) = Π
+(g(z)) (resp. u(1, x) = Π−(g(z))). (A.35)
Then, the following hold:
(1) There exits a solution B on a filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft),Q) to the
following SDE:
dBt = σdWt + σ
2ux(t, Bt)
u(t, Bt)
dt, B0 = x, (A.36)
where u is either u+ or u− and W is a Brownian motion with W0 = 0.
(2) φ+g (x) = E
Q+ [Ψ+(g(B1))] and φ
−
g (x) = E
Q− [Ψ−(g(B1))], where (B,Q+) (resp.
(B,Q−)) corresponds to the solution of (A.36) if u = u+ (resp u = u−) and
EQ stands for the expectation under Q.
(3) φ+g (0) > φ
−
g (0).
(4) Suppose further that g is non-decreasing. Then, φ±g are non-decreasing, too.
Consequently, φg is non-decreasing. Moreover,
φ+g (x) ≤ EQ
+ [
Ψ+(g(σW1 + x))
]
(A.37)
φ−g (x) ≥ EQ
− [
Ψ−(g(σW1 + x))
]
. (A.38)
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Proof. We shall prove the claims for u+ only, the corresponding proof for u− being
analogous.
(1) Note that
u+(t, x) =
∫ ∞
−∞
Π+(g(z))
1√
2piσ2(1− t) exp
(
− (y − z)
2
2σ2(1− t)
)
dz.
Then, if β is a Brownian motion on a filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft),P)
with β0 = 0, u(t, Bt) is a bounded martingale with u(1, B1) = Π
+(g(B1),
where B = σβ + x. Thus, we can define a new measure Q on (Ω,F) by
dQ
dP
=
u(1, B1)
u(0, B0)
.
By means of Girsanov’s theorem, under Q, B solves (A.36).
(2) Observe that
φ+g(x) =
E [Ψ+(g(B1))Π
+(g(B1))]
E [Π+(g(B1))]
=
E [Ψ+(g(B1))u
+(1, B1)]
E [u(1, B1)]
= EQ
[
Ψ+(g(B1))
]
.
(3) The claim is equivalent to∫ ∞
−∞
Φ+(g(z))q(σ, z)dz
∫ ∞
−∞
Π−(g(z))q(σ, z)dz−
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ−(g(z))q(σ, z)dz
∫ ∞
−∞
Π+(g(z))q(σ, z)dz > 0.
Using Φ+ = E[V ]− Φ− and Π+ +Π− = 1, the above is valid if and only if
0 <
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ+(g(z))q(σ, z)dz −E[V ]
∫ ∞
−∞
Π+(g(z))q(σ, z)dz
=
∫ ∞
−∞
(
Ψ+(g(z))− E[V ]) q(σ, z)Π+(g(z))dz,
which holds since for any x we have Ψ+(x) ≥ Ψ+(m) = E[V ] in view of
Lemma A.1 and Ψ+ is not constant.
(4) Now, suppose g is non-decreasing, which in turn implies u+x ≤ 0 since Π+ is
non-increasing. Therefore, as ux(t,x)
u(t,x)
is Lipschitz on [0, t] for any t < T , the
standard comparison results for SDEs applied to (A.36) in conjunction with
Lemma A.1 imply
EQ
[
Ψ+(g(B1))
∣∣B0 = y] ≥ EQ [Ψ+(g(B1))∣∣B0 = x] if y ≥ x
since we can construct all these solutions indexed by their starting point on
the same probability space due to the local Lipschitz property of ux/u. This
shows the desired monotonicity φ+(g).
Similarly, the same comparison principle yields that the solution of (A.36)
is bounded from above by σWt+x in case of u = u
+ since u+x ≤ 0. Combined
with the monotonicity property of Ψ+(g), we deduce φ+g (x) ≤ EQ [Ψ+(g(σW1 + x))].
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
Appendix B. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1. (1) Let g(x) := Ev[h(x+ Z)]. By direct differentiation,
the expression (2.3) implies
xF (x) = x
g(x)
N
+
N − 1
N
∫ x
0
g(y)dy, (B.39)
which is equivalent to
x
g′(x)
N
+ g = F (x) + xF ′(x).
Recall that g(0) = Ev[h(Z)] = F (0) by construction. Thus, the unique solu-
tion of the above ODE with this initial condition is given by
g(x) = NF (x)−N(N − 1)
xN
∫ x
0
F (y)yN−1dy = F (x)+
N(N − 1)
xN
∫ x
0
(F (x)−F (y))yN−1dy.
This yields (2.5) after a change of variable.
(2) The above also yields (2.6) due to the first order condition F (X∗) = V . The
remaining assertions are direct consequences of the strict monotonicity of F .
(3) Finally, note that the total expected profit is given by
∫ X∗
0
(v − Ev[h(y + Z)])dy =
∫ X∗
0
(v − g(y))dy
= vX∗ − N
N − 1
(
X∗F (X∗)−X∗g(X
∗)
N
)
= − vX
∗
N − 1 +
X∗g(X∗)
N − 1 =
X∗
N − 1 (g(X
∗)− v)
= N
∫ X∗
0
(v − F (y))
( y
X∗
)N−1
dy,
where the second equality follows from (B.39) and the third is due to F (X∗) =
V .

Proof of Proposition 2.2. Note that E[h(y + Z)] = Ev[h(y + Z)] for all y. We shall
show the result for N > 1, the remaining case is similar and easier.
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Using the first representation in (2.5), we obtain∫ x
0
E[h(y + Z)]dy = N
∫ x
0
F (y)dy −N(N − 1)
∫ x
0
dyy−N
∫ y
0
dzF (z)zN−1
= N
∫ x
0
F (y)dy −N(N − 1)
∫ x
0
dzF (z)zN−1
∫ x
z
dyy−N
= N
∫ x
0
F (y)dy +N
∫ x
0
dzF (z)zN−1
(
x−N+1 − z−N+1)
= N
∫ x
0
dzF (z)
(z
x
)N−1
= xN
∫ 1
0
dzF (xz)zN−1,
which yields the first assertion once divided by x.
The remaining claims follow from F (xy) < F (x) (resp. F (xy) > F (x)) for x > 0
(resp. x < 0) and for all y ∈ (0, 1) since F is strictly increasing. 
Proof of Proposition 3.2. First observe that φF is bounded since V is a bounded ran-
dom variable by assumption. Thus the dominated convergence theorem in conjunction
with the continuity of Π+, and thus that of Φ+ and Φ−, show that both of lim inf FN
and lim supFN solve (3.14). As (3.14) can have at most one solution, F∞ := limFN
exists.
Also note that F∞ is strictly increasing and continuous by Lemma 3.1. Thus,
limN→∞ F−1N (v) = F
−1
∞ (v) ∈ R. Thus,
lim
N→∞
pi∗(v) = lim
N→∞
F−1N (v)N
∫ 1
0
(v − FN (F−1N (v)y)yN−1dy
= F−1∞ (v) lim
N→∞
N
∫ 1
0
(v − FN(F−1N (v)y)yN−1dy
Since each FN takes values in (m,M), limN→∞ FN(F−1N (v)y) = F∞(F
−1
∞ (v)y), and the
measure NyN−1dy on [0, 1] converges weakly to the point mass at 1, we have
lim
N→∞
N
∫ 1
0
(v − FN(F−1N (v)y)yN−1dy = v − F∞(F−1∞ (v)) = 0.
This completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 3.1. We give the proof for the solutions of (3.11), the analogous
property of the solutions of (3.14) can be proven similarly.
Monotone convergence theorem in conjunction with Assumption 3.1 implies
lim
x→∞
∫ ∞
−∞
q(σ, z)φF (x+ z)dz =
∫ ∞
−∞
q(σ, z) lim
x→∞
φF (x+ z)dz.
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Moreover, limx→∞ φF (x+ z) = Ψ+(F (∞)−). To see this, first note that
φ+F (z + x) =
∫∞
−∞Ψ
+(F (u))Π+(F (u)) 1√
2piσ2
exp
(
− (x+z−u)2
2σ2
)
du∫∞
−∞Π
+(F (u)) 1√
2piσ2
exp
(
− (x+z−u)2
2σ2
)
du
.
Next, the measure
Π+(F (u)q(σ, z + x− u)du∫∞
−∞Π
+(F (u)q(σ, z + x− u)du
converges to the point mass at ∞. Indeed, for any 0 < a <∞, we have
∫ a
−∞Π
+(F (u)q(σ, z + x− u)du∫∞
−∞Π
+(F (u)q(σ, z + x− u)du =
∫ a
−∞Π
+(F (u) exp
(− u2
2σ2
+ u(z+x)
σ2
)
du∫∞
−∞Π
+(F (u) exp
(− u2
2σ2
+ u(z+x)
σ2
)
du
≤ exp(
a(z+x)
σ2
)
∫ a
−∞Π
+(F (u) exp(− u2
2σ2
)du∫∞
2a
Π+(F (u) exp
(− u2
2σ2
+ u(z+x)
σ2
)
du
≤ exp(
−a(z+x)
σ2
)
∫ a
−∞Π
+(F (u) exp(− u2
2σ2
)du∫∞
2a
Π+(F (u) exp
(− u2
2σ2
)
du
,
which converges to 0 as x→∞.
Thus, using the representation of F via (3.12), we deduce
F (∞) = Ψ+(F (∞)−).
Note that changing the order of integration is justified thanks to Assumption 3.1. On
the other hand, Ψ+(x−) > x for any x < M since P (V > x) > 0 whenever x < M .
This in turn implies F (∞) = M . Similarly, limx→−∞ F (x) = m. Thus, F is strictly
increasing in view of (3.12) since m 6= M and, therefore, F is not constant. 
Proof of Theorem 3.2. The proof will be based on an application of Schauder’s fixed
point theorem to a suitable mapping defined on the space of non-decreasing continuous
functions, i.e. the candidate functions for the solution of (3.11). Note that since V
takes values in [m,M ], so does Ψ±. This justifies the representation (3.12) for F .
Since in equilibrium h must also be taking values in [m,M ], we must expect F to
take values in [m,M ], too. Thus, we can concentrate on functions on R that takes
values in [m,M ]. Moreover, F will possess a derivative that is bounded by
K0 := (|m|+M)
∫ ∞
−∞
|z| e
− z2
2σ2
σ3
√
2pi
dz
(
1
N
+
N − 1
2N
)
<∞.
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To see this first observe that
∂q¯(σ, x, z)
∂x
=
q(σ, x− z)− q¯(σ, x, z)
x
=
1
x2
∫ x
0
{q(σ, x− z)− q(σ, y − z)dy}
=
1
x2
∫ x
0
uqx(σ, u− z)du.
Therefore,∣∣∣∣ ddxF (x)
∣∣∣∣ ≤
∫ ∞
−∞
|φF (z)|
{
|qx(σ, x− z)|
N
+
N − 1
Nx2
∫ |x|
0
u|qx(σ, u− z)|du
}
dz
≤ (|m|+M)

 1N
∫ ∞
−∞
|z − x|e
− (z−x)2
2σ2
σ3
√
2pi
dz +
N − 1
Nx2
∫ |x|
0
duu
∫ ∞
−∞
|z − u|e
− (z−u)2
2σ2
σ3
√
2pi
dz


= (|m|+M)
∫ ∞
−∞
|z| e
− z2
2σ2
σ3
√
2pi
dz
(
1
N
+
N − 1
2N
)
.
We shall show the existence of a fixed point in the normed space X := L2(R, µ0), i.e.
the space of Borel measurable functions that are square integrable with respect to µ0,
where
µ0(dx) =
1√
2pi
e−
x2
2 dx.
Note that µ0 is equivalent to the Lebesgue measure on R. Next define
D0 : {g|g : R 7→ [m,M ] is such that |g(x)− g(y)| ≤ K0|x− y|, ∀x, y ∈ R}
and let
D := {g ∈ X |g = g0, µ0-a.e. for some g0 ∈ D0}.
It is easy to see that D is a convex subset of X .
Next define the operator T on X via
Tg(x) :=
∫ ∞
−∞
{
1
N
q(σ, x− z) + N − 1
N
q¯(σ, x, z)
}
φg¯(z)dz,
where g¯ := (g∨m)∧M and φg and q¯ are as defined in (3.10) and (3.13), respectively.
Note that for each x {
1
N
q(σ, x− z) + N − 1
N
q¯(σ, x, z)
}
dz
is a probability measure on R.
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Step 1 (T maps D into itself): It is easy to verify that Tg is continuous and takes
values in [m,M ] in view of Lemma A.2 and that∫ ∞
−∞
{
1
N
q(σ, x− z) + N − 1
N
q¯(σ, x, z)
}
dz = 1.
Moreover, Tg is differentiable with a derivative bounded by K0 by using the
above computations that led to the estimate K0. Thus, Tg ∈ D0 ⊂ D.
Step 2 (D is compact): Let (gn) ⊂ D. Then there exists (g0n) ⊂ D0 such that µ0-a.e.
we have gn = g
0
n for each n ≥ 1. Then by Arzela-Ascoli Theorem there exists
a subsequence that converges uniformly on compacts to a continuous function
g0. Without loss of generality let us assume that g0n converges to g
0. Note that
necessarily |g0(x) − g0(y)| ≤ K0|x − y| for all x, y ∈ R, i.e g0 ∈ D0. Finally,
as gns are uniformly bounded and µ0 is a probability measure, the dominated
convergence theorem yields gn → g0 in L2(R, µ0).
Step 3 (T : D → D is continuous): Suppose gn → g in D as n → ∞. In view of
the definition of D we may assume without loss of generality that that gns
are continuous since changing gn on a Lebesgue null set does not alter the
value of Tgn. By another application of Arzela-Ascoli theorem there exists a
subsequence that converges pointwise to some continuous function, which we
may identify with g due to the uniqueness of L2-limits up to a null set. Thus,
we may assume g is continuous, too.
Moreover, the same argument shows that every subsequence of gn has a
further subsequence that converges to g pointwise since continuous functions
that agree on Lebesgue null sets should agree at every point. Thus, gn → g
pointwise as n→∞.
Next, since φgn is uniformly bounded, the dominated convergence theorem
yields
lim
n→∞
Tgn(x) =
∫ ∞
−∞
dz
{
1
N
q(σ, x− z) + N − 1
N
q¯(σ, x, z)
}
lim
n→∞
φgn(z).
On the other hand, Lemma A.2 and Girsanov theorem imply for z > 0
φgn(z) =
E [Ψ+(gn(σβ1 + z))Π
+(gn(σβ1 + z))]
un(0, z)
,
where E is the expectation operator for P under which β is a standard Brow-
nian motion, and un is the function u+ in Lemma A.2 defined by the terminal
condition Π+(gn). Since Ψ
+ and Π+ are continuous except on a Lebesgue null
set, the dominated convergence theorem yields
lim
n→∞
E
[
Ψ+(gn(σβ1 + z))Π
+(gn(σβ1 + z))
]
= E
[
Ψ+(g(σβ1 + z))Π
+(g(σβ1 + z))
]
.
Similarly,
lim
n→∞
un(0, z) = lim
n→∞
E
[
Π+(gn(σβ1 + z))
]
= E
[
Π+(g(σβ1 + z))
]
.
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Thus, we have shown limn→∞ φgn(z) = φg(z) for z > 0. Analogous arguments
yields the convergence for z ≤ 0, which in turn establishes the pointwise
convergence of Tgn to Tg; i.e.
lim
n→∞
Tgn(x) = Tg(x), x ∈ R.
This yields the claim by an application of the dominated convergence theorem
since Tgns are uniformly bounded.
Therefore, T admits a fixed point in D by Schauder’s fixed point theorem. That is,
there exists a g ∈ D such that g = Tg. Hence, there exists a solution to (3.11). The
claim now follows from Theorem 3.1. 
Proof of Theorem 3.3. (1) Let D be the space of nondecreasing functions on R
that take values in [m,M ] and define an operator T on D via
Tr(x) =
∫ ∞
0
dz
{
1
N
q(σ, x− z) + N − 1
N
q¯(σ, x, z)
}∫ ∞
−∞
Ψ+(r(y))q(σ, z − y)dy
+E[V ]
∫ 0
−∞
dz
{
1
N
q(σ, x− z) + N − 1
N
q¯(σ, x, z)
}
.
First observe that Tr1 ≥ Tr2 if r1 ≤ r2 since Ψ+ is non-decreasing. Thus,
setting r0 ≡ m and rn = Trn−1 for n ≥ 1, we observe that rn is an increasing
sequence of nondecreasing continuous functions taking values in [m,M ]. Thus,
the limit, r∞ exists, is nondecreasing, and continuous by Dini’s theorem. It
also follows from the dominated convergence theorem and that Ψ+ has only
countably many discontinuities that r∞ is a solution of (3.17).
Now let E denote the set of all solutions of (3.17) in D and define
R∗(x) := sup
r∈E
r(x).
Clearly, R∗ takes values in [m,M ]. Due to the aforementioned monotonicity
TR∗ ≥ Tr = r for all r ∈ E . Consequently, TR∗ ≥ R∗. Setting g0 = R∗ and
gn = Tgn−1 for n ≥ 1, we again obtain an increasing sequence which converges
to some element r of E . Moreover, r ≥ R∗, which in turn implies r = R∗ by
the construction of R∗.
Note that if R∗ is constant, it has to equal M since R∗(∞) = M . However,
under this assumption, the right side of (3.17) equals
M
∫ ∞
0
dz
{
1
N
q(σ, x− z) + N − 1
N
q¯(σ, x, z)
}
+E[V ]
∫ 0
−∞
dz
{
1
N
q(σ, x− z) + N − 1
N
q¯(σ, x, z)
}
< M
as E[V ] < M . Thus, R∗ cannot be constant.
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To show the final assertion let F be a solution of (3.11). Since Ψ− ≤ E[V ]
and that φ+F (z) ≤
∫∞
−∞Ψ
+(F (y))q(σ, z − y)dy by (A.37), we deduce that
F (x) ≤ TF (x).
As above, setting g0 = F and gn = Tgn−1 for n ≥ 1, we again obtain an
increasing sequence which converges to a member of E , which proves the claim.
(2) Since Ψ− ≤ E[V ], the proof follows the similar lines as above and, hence,
omitted

Proof of Theorem 4.1. We shall give a proof of the first statement as the second one
can be proven along similar lines. We can assume without loss of generality that
E[V ] = 0 since, otherwise, we can replace V by V − E[V ] and redefine Ψ+ and R
accordingly.
By means of a straightforward change of variable we obtain for x > 0
G(αx)
G(α)
=
1
N
∫ ∞
0
dzq
(σ
α
, x− z
) ∫ ∞
−∞
dyq
(σ
α
, z − y
)M −Ψ+(R(αy))
M − R(α)
+
N − 1
N
∫ ∞
0
dzq¯
(σ
α
, x, z
) ∫ ∞
−∞
dyq
(σ
α
, y − z
)M −Ψ+(R(αy))
M − R(α) .(B.40)
+
M
M − R(α)
∫ 0
−∞
dz
{
1
N
q
(σ
α
, x− z
)
+
N − 1
N
q¯
(σ
α
, x, z
)}
Observe that the measure q(σ
α
, x − z)dz converges to the Dirac measure at point
x > 0 as α→∞.
Step 1: For y > 0
(M −Ψ+(R(αy))
M − R(α) =
(M − R(αy))Ψ+x (y∗)
M − R(α)
for some y∗ ≥ R(αy) by the Mean Value Theorem, where Ψ+x stands for the
derivative of Ψ+, since Ψ+(M) =M . Thus,
lim
α→∞
(M −Ψ+(R(αy))
M −R(α) =
(M −R(αy))Ψ+x (y∗)
M − R(α) = Ψ
+
x (M) lim
α→∞
G(αy)
G(α)
(B.41)
as R(∞) =M .
Step 2: Let γ∗(x) := lim infα→∞
G(αx)
G(α)
. Then, in view of the first step, Fatou’s lemma
yields
γ∗(x) ≥ Ψ
+
x (M)
N
γ∗(x) +
N − 1
Nx
Ψ+x (M)
∫ x
0
γ∗(y)dy.
Thus, if γ∗(x) = 0 for some x > 0, it must be 0 for almost all x > 0. However,
γ∗(x) ≥ 1 for all x ∈ (0, 1) since G is decreasing. Thus, γ∗ > 0 for all x > 0.
In particular, γ∗ is bounded away from 0 on [0, n] for any n ≥ 1.
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Step 3: It follows from Step 2 and Corollary 2.0.5 in [6] that
xd
C
≤ G(αx)
G(α)
≤ Cxc forx ≥ 1 and α ≥ α0
for some constants c, d, C and α0. Moreover, since for x < 1 we have
G(αx)
G(α)
=
(
G(αxx−1)
G(αx))
)−1
,
and αx > α0 for large enough α, we deduce that the mapping (α, x) 7→ G(αx)G(α)
is bounded when x belongs to bounded intervals in (0,∞).
Step 4: Moreover,
(M − R(α))α ≥ N − 1
N
∫ α
0
du
∫ ∞
0
dzq(σ, u− z)
∫ ∞
−∞
dy(M −Ψ+(R(y)))q(σ, z − y),
which in turn implies
1
M − R(α) ≤ Kα, α > 1 for some K <∞. (B.42)
Since G(αx)
G(α)
is bounded when x belongs to bounded intervals in (0,∞) by Step
3, we obtain, for any ε > 0,
lim
α→∞
∫ ∞
−∞
dzq
(σ
α
, x−z
) ∫ z+ε
z−ε
dyq
(σ
α
, z−y
)M −Ψ+(R(αy))
M − R(α) = Ψ
+
x (M)γ(x), (B.43)
where γ(x) := limα→∞
G(αx)
G(α)
in view of (B.41) provided that the limit exists.
Furthermore, in view of (B.42) we also have∫ ∞
−∞
dzq
(σ
α
, x− z
) ∫
R\(z−ε,z+ε)
dyq
(σ
α
, z − y
)M −Ψ+(R(αy))
M −R(α)
≤ KM
∫ ∞
−∞
dzq
(σ
α
, x− z
) ∫
R\(z−ε,z+ε)
dyαq
(σ
α
, z − y
)
→ 0 as α→∞. (B.44)
Step 5: Applying the arguments of Step 4 to the second and the third integrals in
(B.40) now shows that for x > 0
γ(x) =
Ψ+x (M)
N
γ(x) +
N − 1
Nx
Ψ+x (M)
∫ x
0
γ(y)dy. (B.45)
In particular, limα→∞
G(αx)
G(α)
exists. Using the initial condition that γ(1) = 1,
direct manipulations show that
γ(x) = xρ
+
.

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Proof of Theorem 4.2. We shall again only give the proof the first statement and
assume without loss of generality that E[V ] = 0.
For any α > 0 define
r(α, x) :=
R(αx)−R(α)
(M − R(α))n+1 .
Straightforward manipulations similar to the ones employed in the proof of Theorem
4.1 leads to
r(α, x) = − R(α)
(M − R(α))n+1
∫ 0
−∞
dz
{
1
N
q
(σ
α
, x− z
)
+
N − 1
N
q¯
(σ
α
, x, z
)}
+
∫ ∞
0
dz
{
1
N
q
(σ
α
, x− z
)
+
N − 1
N
q¯
(σ
α
, x, z
)}∫ ∞
1
dyq
(σ
α
, z − y
)Ψ+(R(αy))−R(α)
(M − R(α))n+1
+
∫ ∞
0
dz
{
1
N
q
(σ
α
, x− z
)
+
N − 1
N
q¯
(σ
α
, x, z
)}∫ 1
−∞
dyq
(σ
α
, z − y
)Ψ+(R(αy))− R(α)
(M −R(α))n+1
≤
∫ ∞
0
dz
{
1
N
q
(σ
α
, x− z
)
+
N − 1
N
q¯
(σ
α
, x, z
)}∫ ∞
1
dyq
(σ
α
, z − y
)Ψ+(R(αy))−R(α)
(M − R(α))n+1
+
∫ ∞
0
dz
{
1
N
q
(σ
α
, x− z
)
+
N − 1
N
q¯
(σ
α
, x, z
)}∫ 1
−∞
dyq
(σ
α
, z − y
)Ψ+(R(α))− R(α)
(M − R(α))n+1
≤ K +
∫ ∞
0
dz
{
1
N
q
(σ
α
, x− z
)
+
N − 1
N
q¯
(σ
α
, x, z
)}∫ ∞
1
dyq
(σ
α
, z − y
)Ψ+(R(αy))− R(α)
(M − R(α))n+1
for some K > 0 independent of α, where the first inequality follows from that R ≥
E[V ] = 0 and R(αy) ≤ R(α) for y ≤ 1 and the second is due to the boundedness of
Ψ+(R(αy))−R(α)
(M−R(α))n+1 .
Moreover, for y > 1
Ψ+(R(αy))− R(α)
(M − R(α))n+1 =
Ψ+(R(αy))−R(αy)
(M − R(α))n+1 + r(α, y)
≤ Ψ
+(R(αy))−R(αy)
(M −R(αy))n+1 + r(α, y)
due to the monotonicity of R. Thus, utilising the boundedness of Ψ
+(R(αy))−R(α)
(M−R(α))n+1 once
more, we arrive at
r(α, x) ≤ κ+
∫ ∞
0
dz
{
1
N
q
(σ
α
, x− z
)
+
N − 1
N
q¯
(σ
α
, x, z
)}∫ ∞
1
dyq
(σ
α
, z−y
)
r(α, y).
(B.46)
for some κ ∈ (0,∞) that is independent of α.
Step 1: Let κ be as above and consider the operator T : C([1,∞), [0,∞))→ C([1,∞), [0,∞))
defined by
Tf(x) = κ+
∫ ∞
0
dz
{
1
N
q
(σ
α
, x− z
)
+
N − 1
N
q¯
(σ
α
, x, z
)}∫ ∞
1
dyq
(σ
α
, z − y
)
f(y).
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Clearly T is increasing, i.e. Tf ≥ Tg if f ≥ g.
Step 2: For z ≥ 0 and c ∈ R,∫ ∞
c
dyq
(σ
α
, z − y
)
y =
σ2
α2
q
(σ
α
, z − c
)
+ z
∫ ∞
c−z
dyq
(σ
α
, y
)
≤ z + σ
α
√
2pi
. (B.47)
Thus, if f(x) = βx+ δ for some β > 0 and δ ≥ 0, we have
Tf(x) ≤ δ + κ +
√
2σβ
α
√
pi
+
βx
N
+ β
N − 1
xN
∫ x
0
ydy
= δ + κ +
√
2σβ
α
√
pi
+
βx(N + 1)
2N
≤ δ + κ + β
(√
2σ
α
√
pi
+
3x
4
)
,
where the last inequality is due to the hypothesis that N ≥ 2.
In particular, given β = γκ for some γ > 4, Tf ≤ f whenever α ≥ 4
√
2σγ√
pi(γ−4) .
Step 3: Define
D(α) := {f : [1,∞)→ [0,∞) : f is continuous and f(x) ≤ 5κx+ 1
(M − R(α))n∀x ≥ 1}.
and observe that the restriction of r(α, ·) to [1,∞) belongs to D(α) for all
α > 0.
In view of Step 2 we have that TD(α) ⊂ D(α) for large enough α. Thus, it
admits a fixed point in D(α) for large enough α by Tarski’s theorem (Theorem
1 in [25]). In fact, it admits a unique fixed point. Indeed, if f and g are two
fixed points of T in D(α),
(f−g)(x) =
∫ ∞
0
dz
{
1
N
q
(σ
α
, x− z
)
+
N − 1
N
q¯
(σ
α
, x, z
)}∫ ∞
1
dyq
(σ
α
, z−y
)
(f−g)(y).
Thus,
inf
x≥1
(f − g)(x) ≥ inf
x≥1
(f − g)(x) inf
x≥1
∫ ∞
0
dz
{
1
N
q
(σ
α
, x− z
)
+
N − 1
N
q¯
(σ
α
, x, z
)}∫ ∞
1
dyq
(σ
α
, z − y
)
= c inf
x≥1
(f − g)(x)
for some c ∈ (0, 1). Since infx≥1(f − g)(x) <∞, the above implies infx≥1(f −
g)(x) ≤ 0. Applying the same argument to g − f , we deduce f = g.
Moreover, taking f ∗(x) = 5κx and utilising the previous step we deduce
that the unique fixed point is bounded from above by f ∗. Theorem 1 in [25]
now yields that r(α, ·) ≤ f ∗ for large enough α in view of (B.46).
Step 4: In view of Step 3 we have that r(α, x) ≤ 10κ for all x ∈ [1, 2] for large enough
α. Thus, Theorem 3.1.5 in [6] yields r(α, ·) is bounded in bounded subintervals
of (0,∞) uniformly in α.
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Step 5: In view of Step 4 and using arguments similar to the ones used in Steps 4 and
5 of the proof of Theorem 4.1, we arrive at
γ(x) =
1
k
+
γ(x)
N
+
N − 1
xN
∫ x
0
γ(y)dy,
where γ(x) := limα→∞ r(α, x) for x > 0. The unique solution of the above
equation with γ(1) = 0 is given by
γ(x) =
N
k(N − 1) log x.
Step 6: Consider
g(x) := exp
(
(M −R(x))−n).
Observe that
g(αx)
g(α)
= exp
(
(M − R(α))n − (M − R(αx))n
(M − R(α))n(M − R(αx))n
)
= exp
(
(R(αx)− R(α))∑n−1i=0 (M − R(α)n−1−i(M − R(αx)i
(M −R(α))n(M −R(αx))n
)
= exp
(
R(αx)−R(α)
(M −R(α))n+1
M −R(α)
M − R(αx)
n−1∑
i=0
(
M −R(α)
M − R(αx)
)n−1−i)
,
which converges to exp(nγ(x)) as α → ∞ since M − R is slowly varying at
∞. Thus,
g(x) = x
N
N−1
n
k s(x), x > 0.
where s is a slowly varying function at ∞. That is,
(M − R(x))−n = N
N − 1
n
k
log x+ log s(x).
Since limx→∞
log s(x)
log x
= 0 (cf. Proposition 1.3.6 (i) and (iii) in [6]), we have
M −R(x) ∼
(
N
N − 1
n
k
)− 1
n
(log x)−
1
n . x→∞.

Proof of Corollary 4.1. Again we only prove the first statement. The hypothesis im-
plies Ψ+(x) − x is regularly varying with index n + 1 at M . Thus, Ψ+(R) − R is
regularly varying of index (n+ 1)ρ+ at ∞, which in particular implies
lim
x→∞
Ψ+(R(x))− R(x)∫∞
x
Ψ+(R(y))−R(y)
y
dy = − lim
x→∞
x(Ψ+x (R(x)R
′(x)− R′(x))
Ψ+(R(x))− R(x) = −(n+1)ρ
+, (B.48)
in view of Theorem 1.5.11(ii) in [6].
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Moreover, direct manipulations yield
Π+(x) =
∫M
x
Π+(y)dy
Ψ+(x)− x ,
which in turn implies
−Π
+
x (x)
Π+(x)
=
Ψ+x (x)
Ψ+(x)− x.
Therefore,
lim
x→∞
xΠ+x (R(x))R
′(x)
Π+(R(x))
= − lim
x→∞
xR′(x)Ψ+x (R(x))
Ψ+(R(x))− R(x)
= −(n + 1)ρ+ − lim
x→∞
xR′(x)
Ψ+(R(x))−R(x)
= −(n + 1)ρ+ − k lim
x→∞
xR′(x)
(M −R(x))n+1 ,
where the second equality follows from (B.48).
Note that if Ψ+x (M) < 1, n = 0 and k =
1
1−Ψ+(M) (see Remark 3). In this case,
lim
x→∞
xR′(x)
M − R(x) = −ρ
+
by Theorem Theorem 1.5.11(ii ) in [6]. Thus,
lim
x→∞
xΠ+x (R(x))R
′(x)
Π+(R(x)
= ρ+(k − 1) = − Ψ
+
x (M)
1 − Ψ+x (M)
N
.
An application of Exercise 1.11.13 in [6] to 1/Π+(R) establishes the claim.
Now, suppose Ψ+x (M) = 1 and observe that n is necessarily bigger than 0 and
ρ+ = 0 in this case. Recall the function g in Step 6 of the proof of Theorem 4.2 and
note that
lim
x→∞
xg′(x)
g(x)
=
Nn
(N − 1)k
by another application of Theorem 1.5.11(i) in [6]. Since
xg′(x)
g(x)
=
xnR′(x)
(M − R(x))n+1 ,
we arrive at
lim
x→∞
xR′(x)
(M − R(x))n+1 =
N
k(N − 1) .
Therefore,
lim
x→∞
xΠ+x (R(x))R
′(x)
Π+(R(x)
= − N
N − 1 = −
Ψ+x (M)
1− Ψ+x (M)
N
,
and we again conclude by means of Exercise 1.11.13 in [6]. 
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Proof of Theorem 4.3. We shall give a proof of the first statement as the second one
can be proven along similar lines.
By means of a change of variable employed in earlier proofs we obtain for x > 0
G(αx)
G(α)
=
1
N
∫ ∞
0
dzq
(σ
α
, x− z
) ∫ ∞
−∞
ν(α, z, dy)dy
M −Ψ+(F (αy))
M − F (α)
+
N − 1
N
∫ ∞
0
dzq¯
(σ
α
, x, z
) ∫ ∞
−∞
ν(α, z, dy)dy
M −Ψ+(F (αy))
M − F (α) (B.49)
+
1
M − F (α)
∫ 0
−∞
dz
{
1
N
q
(σ
α
, x− z
)
+
N − 1
N
q¯
(σ
α
, x, z
)}
φF (αz),
where
ν(α, z, dy) :=
Π+(F (αy)q
(
σ
α
, y − z
)
)∫∞
−∞ duΠ
+(F (αu)q
(
σ
α
, u− z
)
)
dy. (B.50)
We shall first demonstrate that for z > 0 the measure ν(α, z, dy) converges to the
Dirac measure at point z as α→∞. Indeed, let R∗ be the maximal solution of (3.17)
and observe that for any ε > 0 and z > 0
ν(α, z, (R\(z−ε, z+ε))) =
∫
R\(z−ε,z+ε) dyΠ
+(F (αy)q
(
σ
α
, y − z
)
∫∞
−∞ duΠ
+(F (αu)q
(
σ
α
, u− z
) ≤
∫
R\(z−ε,z+ε) dyq
(
σ
α
, y − z
)
∫∞
0
duΠ+(R(αu)q
(
σ
α
, u− z
) ,
where the last inequality is due to the fact that F ≤ R∗ by Theorem 3.3.
Moreover, since Π+(R) is regularly varying at ∞ with some index r ≤ 0 by Corol-
lary 4.1, we have Π+(R(αu) ≥ c(1 + u)r−δαr−δ for some c > 0 for all u ≥ 0 by
Proposition 1.3.6(v) in [6]. Therefore,
ν(α, z, (R\(z − ε, z + ε))) ≤
αδ−r
∫
R\(z−ε,z+ε) dyq
(
σ
α
, y − z
)
c
∫∞
0
du(1 + u)r−δq
(
σ
α
, u− z
) , (B.51)
the right side of which converges to 0 as α→∞. Similary, we can show
lim
α→∞
ν(α, z, (−∞, z − ε)) = 0.
Step 1: Let γ∗(x) := lim infα→∞
G(αx)
G(α)
. It follows from the same argument in Step 2
of the proof of Theorem 4.1 that γ∗ is bounded away from 0 on [0, n] for any
n ≥ 1. This in turn implies the mapping (α, x) 7→ G(αx)
G(α)
is bounded when x
belongs to bounded intervals in (0,∞) as in Step 3 of the same proof.
Step 2: Moreover, since F ≤ R∗, (B.42) yields
1
M − R(α) ≤ Kα, α > 1 for some K <∞.
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Thus, the arguments of Steps 4 and 5 of the proof of Theorem 4.1 are still
applicable due to (B.51) and that Ψ−F ≤ E[V ]. Consequently, γ still satisfies
(B.45), where γ(x) = limx→∞
G(αx)
G(α)
. In particular, γ(x) = xρ
+
.
Step 3: If Ψ+x (M), the proof of Theorem 4.2 can be applied verbatim once we show
that f(α, ·) is bounded in [1, 2] uniformly in α, where
f(α, x) :=
F (αx)− F (α)
(M − F (α))n+1 .
Since F (α) is eventually larger than E[V ] and φF (z) ≤ E[V ] for z < 0, we
have for large enough α
f(α, x) =
∫ 0
−∞
dz
{
1
N
q
(σ
α
, x− z
)
+
N − 1
N
q¯
(σ
α
, x, z
)} φF (αz)− F (α)
(M − F (α))n+1
+
∫ ∞
0
dz
{
1
N
q
(σ
α
, x− z
)
+
N − 1
N
q¯
(σ
α
, x, z
)}∫ ∞
−∞
ν(α, z, dy)
Ψ+(F (αy))− F (α)
(M − F (α))n+1
≤
∫ ∞
0
dz
{
1
N
q
(σ
α
, x− z
)
+
N − 1
N
q¯
(σ
α
, x, z
)}∫ ∞
−∞
q
(σ
α
, z − y
)Ψ+(F (αy))− F (α)
(M − F (α))n+1 ,
where the last inequality follows from Part (4) of Lemma A.2 since Ψ+(F (αy))
is increasing in y for positive α. Thus, f(α, ·) can be shown to be bounded by
the same function that bounds r(α, ·) introduces in the proof of Theorem 4.2.
Repeating the remaining arguments therein yields the claim.

Proof of Corollary 4.3. It follows from Theorem 3.1 that F ∗ must solve (3.11). In
particular F ∗ is regularly varying at ∞ of order ρ+.
In view of Proposition 2.2 we have
M − IS∗(x)
M − F ∗(x) = N
∫ 1
0
M − F ∗(xy)
M − F ∗(x) y
N−1dy =
N
∫ x
0
(M − F ∗(y))yN−1dy
xN (M − F ∗(x)) .
Observe that limy→∞(M − F ∗(y))y−ρ+ε = ∞ by Proposition 1.3.6 (v) in [6]. Thus,∫∞
0
(M − F ∗(y))yN−1dy =∞. This justifies the application of the L’Hospital rule to
arrive at
lim
x→∞
M − IS∗(x)
M − F ∗(x) = limx→∞
N(M − F ∗(x))xN−1
NxN−1(M − F ∗(x))− xNF ∗x (x)
=
1
1− limx→∞ xF ∗x (x)N(M−F ∗(x))
=
1
1 + ρ
+
N
=
N
N + ρ+
,
where the third equality follows from Exercise 1.11.13 applied to 1/(M − F ).
Asymptotic relationship near −∞ is proved the same way. 
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